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SUMMARY OF MEASURES

CONSIDERED OR CARRIED OUT IN THE MILITARY
DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

DURING THE

VICEROYALTY OF THE EARL OF
ELGIN AND KINCARDINE

JANUARY 1894 TO DECEMBER 1898.



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January 1894.

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December 1898.

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Assistant Accountant-General.

Mr. E. O'B. Smith.

SUMMARY OF MEASURES

DURING THE

VICEROYALTY OF THE EARL OF ELGIN AND KINCARDINE

1894—98.

I.—Administration of the Army.

1895.

THE abolition of the presidential system of the Armies of India, which had been urged on the Secretary of State since 1881, and which on the expiration of the tenure of Lord Lansdowne's term of office had arrived at the stage of a Bill (Madras and Bombay Armies' Act 1893, 56 and 57 Vict., Cap. 62), was carried out under section 3 of that Act, with effect from the 1st April 1895 (G. G. O. No. 980, dated 26th October 1894). Introduction of the four Command system.

The changes in the administration and organisation of the Army of India were as follow :—

The Bengal Army was sub-divided into the Bengal and Punjab Commands, and the whole Army of India, consisting of the Punjab, Bengal, Madras and Bombay Commands, was placed under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief in India and the control of the Government of India, a Lieutenant-General being appointed to each command.

Details as to the powers of the Lieutenant-Generals Commanding, the conduct of business hitherto transacted by the Military Department of the Governments of Madras and Bombay, the distribution of the district commands, and the composition of the several forces in each command, etc., etc., were published in G. G. O. No. 981, dated 26th October 1894, clause No. 143 of India Army Circulars of 1894, and G. O. C. C. No. 1016, dated 26th October 1894.

As the system under which Cantonment Magistrates were appointed prior to 1892 failed to attract competent officers, the Secretary of State sanctioned appointments in the Judge Advocate-General's Department being reserved preferentially—though not exclusively—for qualified Cantonment Magistrates. Subsequently all Cantonment Magistracies in India were grouped according to their importance; revised rates of pay and conditions of service for officers holding these appointments were introduced; and the Cantonment Magistrates' Department was formed into an Imperial Service under the Home Department of the Government of India. These measures were carried out in 1895. Pay and status of Cantonment Magistrates, grouping of Cantonments, and formation of Cantonment Magistracies into an Imperial Service under the Government of India.

1897.

The attention of the Government of India having been directed to the status and organisation of certain of the local corps maintained under the Local corps placed under the orders of the Commander-in-

Chief and made subject to the Articles of War.

orders of the Government of India, it was recommended to the Secretary of State in September 1896 that all these corps should be placed, for purposes of discipline and internal economy, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India. A Government General Order laying down a plan whereby the administration of these corps might be improved was forwarded to the Secretary of State with the proposal that it should be issued in the Foreign Department, accompanied by a notification bringing the whole of these corps under the Indian Articles of War.

As regards the Hyderabad Contingent, it was proposed that official instructions should be issued to the Resident directing him to forward through the Commander-in-Chief in India all matters connected with the Contingent on which the orders of the Government of India might be required, his control over the Contingent remaining undisturbed, the only alteration lying in the channel by which correspondence should reach the Government of India.

These proposals having been approved by the Secretary of State, the two notifications above referred to,—the one (No. 563-I.-B., dated 12th February 1897) placing the several local corps * under the Indian Articles of War, and the other (No. 564-I.-B., dated 12th February 1897) placing them under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief,—were issued in the Foreign Department, and the Resident, Hyderabad, was instructed as proposed in Military Department No. 555-B., dated 23rd February 1897.

As regards the Malwa and Meywar Bhil Corps, it was subsequently represented by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief that as these corps were best fitted for local work, and as it was not intended to employ them on general service, it would be advisable to exempt them from the provisions of the Indian Articles of War, so far as those provisions relate to general service. The Government of India concurring, the exemption of these corps from liability for general service was notified in G. G. O. No. 681 of 1898.

II.—Strength, Organisation and Distribution of the Army.

1895.

Reorganisation of the Bombay Army on the class squadron and class company system.

The reorganisation of the Bombay Army on the class company system, which the Secretary of State was asked to sanction in 1893, was finally carried out in March 1895.

Reorganisation of the Madras infantry on the class company system.

During Lord Lansdowne's administration the improvement of the Madras Army generally was under consideration, and the Madras Government were asked to submit a scheme for gradually reorganising that army on the "class company" in substitution of the then existing "general mixture" system. Proposals were accordingly submitted by the Madras Government in 1894, under which the Telugu class were to be allowed to die out and Mahomedans, Tamils, Pariahs, Cullars, Agambadyans, Marawars, Moplabs, Coorgs and hill Oriyas recruited and organised in class companies.

-
- * (1) The Central India Horse.
 - (2) The Malwa Bhil Corps.
 - (3) The Bhopal Battalion.
 - (4) The Deoli Irregular Force.
 - (5) The Brinpara Irregular Force.
 - (6) The Meywar Bhil Corps; and
 - (7) The Marwar Battalion.

The Secretary of State having approved the proposed reorganisation, the Government of India, in 1895, sanctioned the formation of class companies in regiments from existing material.

A report is now awaited from the Lieutenant-General Commanding, Madras, shewing the progress made in the formation of class companies under this scheme. The final composition of Madras regiments will be considered when a sufficient knowledge of the Madras recruiting area has been obtained to enable the local authorities to judge how many companies of each of the fighting classes can probably be kept up.

1896.

In January 1895, the Resident, Hyderabad, was asked whether the system of reserves in the Hyderabad Contingent had proved a success, and whether he was of opinion that the system obtaining in the regular native army should be introduced into the force.

Abolition of the Hyderabad Contingent reserves.

The Resident, in his report on the subject, having remarked that under existing treaty arrangements it was doubtful whether the maintenance of reserves could be justified, and the Commander-in-Chief being of opinion that they were unnecessary in the Hyderabad Contingent, the Government of India sanctioned their abolition, which is to be effected by allowing the existing reserves to die out gradually, reserve pay continuing to be passed to the men until finally discharged.

1897.

Regulations for the admission of gentlemen to the Indian Army Reserve of Officers, the formation of which was sanctioned by the Secretary of State for India in 1889, were issued in G. G. O. No. 308, dated 31st March 1894.

Formation of an Indian Army Reserve of Officers.

When considering the question of the deficiency in the number of British officers in India to meet the requirements of war on a large scale, the attention of the Government of India was drawn to the slow progress made in forming this reserve of officers under the regulations published in the G. G. O. above quoted. The Government of India thereupon directed the assembly of a Committee, representative of the various interests concerned, to consider and report on the existing regulations for the admission of gentlemen to the Indian Army Reserve of Officers and any other matters connected therewith that might be laid before them. The Committee was duly formed and made certain proposals, which have received the careful consideration of the Government of India and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the Secretary of State for India is about to be addressed on the subject.

With the approval of the Secretary of State for India the reorganisation of the cavalry and infantry regiments of the Hyderabad Contingent on the class squadron and class company system was carried out in 1897. The future class composition of these regiments was laid down in G. G. O. No. 1165 of 1897.

Reorganisation of the Hyderabad Contingent cavalry and infantry on the class squadron and class company system.

In view of the absolute necessity for every possible economy, owing to the severely strained condition of the finances, the Government of India in August 1894 suggested for the consideration of His Excellency the Governor of Madras the possibility of reducing the strength of the Madras Body-Guard to that of

Reorganisation of the Body-Guard of the Governor of Madras.

PROGRESS OF VOLUNTEERING.

1894.

Position of volunteer
corps with respect to
Local Governments
after the abolition of
the Presidential
Army system.

The abolition of the Presidential Army system and the formation of the four Commands necessitated some change in the method of dealing with various volunteer matters. The principal changes are—

- (a) The powers hitherto possessed by the Governments of Madras and Bombay only in disposing of questions of appointments, promotions, resignations, retirements, etc., of volunteer officers, have been extended to all the other Local Governments.
- (b) As regards the appointment of Commandants, the recommendations of Local Governments are in all cases submitted for the approval of His Excellency the Governor General in Council.
- (c) The powers heretofore possessed by the Governments of Madras and Bombay only in regard to the appointment of military adjutants to volunteer corps in consultation with Lieutenant-Generals Commanding, have been extended to the other Local Governments, who now also appoint military adjutants to the corps in their respective provinces in a similar manner.

1894-95.

Institution of the
Volunteer Officers'
Decoration and of
the Volunteer Long
Service Medal.

The provisions of the Army Orders instituting the Volunteer Officers' Decoration and the Volunteer Long Service Medal in England have, with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, been extended to the volunteer forces of India (the former in 1894 and the latter in 1895). The officers' decoration is supplied as required from England; the long service medal is struck in India.

1898.

Reorganisation of
the Presidency Vol-
unteers.

In March 1898, the Government of India sanctioned the abolition of the Administrative Battalion, Presidency Volunteers, as well as of the appointment of paid Commandant connected with it, and the reconstitution of the various corps comprising the battalion (the Calcutta Light Horse, the Cossipore Artillery Volunteers, the Calcutta Volunteer Rifles and the Eastern Bengal State Railway Volunteer Rifles) into separate and independent bodies, each under its own commanding officer. At the same time the amalgamation of the Presidency Volunteer Rifles Battalion with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Calcutta Volunteer Rifles, into one corps of three battalions, was sanctioned.

Proposed re-arma-
ment of the volun-
teer forces in India.

The Government of India have had under consideration the question of re-arming the volunteer forces in India with the '305" Martini-Enfield arm in place of their present '450" arm. It has been decided that no definite step shall be taken at present, but two thousand Martini-Henry rifles are being sent to England this season for conversion into Martini-Enfield carbines, with a view to trial by the volunteers in India.

III.—Mobilisation of the Army.

1896.

Equipment of the
Field Army.

Sanction was accorded to the supply of commissariat equipment and stores for the 3rd and 4th Divisions and extra units of the Field Army, and to the

maintenance in peace time of the number of mules required for three divisions and a total of 3,250 camels. The present establishment of mules in India is 18,717. Maintenance of additional transport.

IV.—Moral and Material Improvement of the Army.

1895.

In order to enhance the efficiency of the Hyderabad Contingent cavalry and improve the position of the sowars, the Government of India recommended to the Secretary of State (Despatch No. 226, dated 26th December 1894) that their pay should be assimilated to that of the Bengal and Bombay cavalry, by raising the pay of sowars from Rs. 30 to Rs. 31 and by allowing them good-conduct pay. Grant of increased pay and of good-conduct pay to the cavalry of Hyderabad Contingent.

The Secretary of State (Despatch No. 23, dated 7th March 1895) having accepted these proposals, the following measures were sanctioned (G. G. O. No. 486 of 1895, republished as Clause 76 of India Army Circulars, 1895), with effect from the 1st April 1895 :—

- (a) The pay of sowars of regiments of cavalry of the Hyderabad Contingent to be raised from Rs. 30 to Rs. 31 per month.
- (b) The sowars of the cavalry of the Hyderabad Contingent to be eligible for good-conduct pay under the provisions of Article 87, Army Regulations, India, Volume I, Part II, the second and third rates being at once admitted to such men as might be entitled thereto by length of service and good-conduct.

With a view to the assimilation of the rates of pay of the native ranks of the Deoli and Erinpura Irregular Cavalry with those prevailing in Bengal cavalry regiments, the Government of India in January 1895 sanctioned the reduction of the existing strength in each corps from 164 to 100 of all ranks, the reduced force being paid at Bengal cavalry rates. The saving under this re-organisation was estimated at Rs. 43,656 per annum. Reduction in numbers and grant of increased pay to the Deoli and Erinpura Cavalry.

1895-96.

The necessity for raising the pay of the non-mounted branches of the native army having been urged on the Government of India by the Commander-in-Chief, the following proposals were made to the Secretary of State in Despatch No. 23, dated 23rd January 1895 :— Grant of increased pay to the non-mounted branches of the native army, the Madras Cavalry, and the Viceroy's Body-Guard, and to local corps under the Government of India.

- (i) That the pay of all non-commissioned ranks in the native artillery (including drivers of British batteries), the three corps of sappers and miners, and the native infantry, should be increased by Rs. 2 per mensem.
- (ii) That the grant of the annual half-mounting allowance of Rs. 5 should commence from date of enlistment.

The Madras cavalry, who did not participate in the increase of pay granted to the silahdar cavalry in 1890, the Viceroy's Body-Guard, and the local corps * under the Government of India also shared in this increase of pay,

* Deoli Infantry.
Erinpura Infantry.
Bhopal Battalion.
Malwa Bhil Corps.
Meywar Bhil Corps.

Nepal Escort.
Merwara Battalion.
Hyderabad Contingent Artillery.
Hyderabad Contingent Infantry.

which was sanctioned by the Secretary of State in Despatch No. 27, dated 14th March 1895, and announced in G. G. Os. Nos. 670, dated 28th June 1895, and 370, dated 10th April 1896.

The expenditure involved in this measure amounted to Rs. 29,64,808. As a set off against the extra cost (Rs. 1,34,382) of increasing the pay of the infantry and artillery of the Hyderabad Contingent, certain economies were carried out, which resulted in a saving of about Rs. 1,10,366, thus reducing the extra cost, as far as the Hyderabad Contingent was concerned, to about Rs. 24,000.

Subsequently in September 1896, with the sanction of the Secretary of State, the pay of havildars and naicks of drivers of artillery was also increased by one rupee per mensem. The increase was announced in G. G. O. No. 169 of 1896.

1896.

Institution of a new medal styled "the India Medal, 1895" to commemorate military operations in or on the frontier of India.

In 1896 a new medal was instituted to commemorate wars in India and on the frontier, in substitution of the India medal of 1854.

The Indian general service medal was instituted in 1854, on the suggestion of Lord Dalhousie, to avoid the multiplication of medals, and it was first issued to commemorate the second Burmese War of 1852-53. With the exception of the Indian Mutiny and the Afghan War of 1878-80, for which special medals were given, the India medal of 1854 had been granted for all Indian campaigns during the preceding forty years, and it had, in 1895, no less than twenty-one clasps,—some officers and native soldiers possessing as many as nine and ten. The decoration had thus become so common as to lose, in the estimation of soldiers, especially those of the native army, much of its value as a visible record of their achievements in the field, and there was a wide-spread feeling among those who had earned clasp after clasp that the time had come for something more being granted, in recognition of their services, than the addition of mere clasps to the medal already possessed by them. It was accordingly recommended to the Secretary of State, in connection with the grant of a medal for the defence and relief of Chitral in 1895, that the opportunity should be taken to inaugurate a new India medal, with a distinctive ribbon, and to grant it first to the troops who took part in those operations, and thus place the defence and relief of Chitral at the head of a new series of minor wars and expeditions for which an India medal is granted, a distinction which the operations justly merited.

Her Majesty the Queen was pleased to approve of the proposal, and sanctioned a new medal, styled "the India Medal, 1895," being struck to commemorate military operations which might take place from time to time in India or on the frontier, for which the India medal of 1854 had hitherto been granted.

Since its institution the following clasps have been issued with the new medal—

- " Defence of Chitral, 1895."
- " Relief of Chitral, 1895."
- " Punjab Frontier, 1897-98."
- " Malakand, 1897."
- " Samana, 1897."
- " Tirah, 1897-98."

V.—The Army Departments.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

1895.

In consequence of the introduction of cordite, the Gun-Powder Factory at Madras was abolished.

Abolition of the Gun-Powder Factory, Madras.

In order to carry out the proof of projectiles manufactured at the Foundry and Shell Factory, Cossipore, and thus obviate the necessity for sending projectiles manufactured in India to England for proof, a Proof Department was established at Balasore.

Establishment of a Proof Department in India.

1896.

In order to provide a small reserve of officers, the strength of the Ordnance Department was increased by four officers.

Reserve of officers for the Ordnance Department.

1897.

It was decided to provide '303" Maxim machine-guns for the British infantry regiments of the Field Army, and the supply was taken in hand. A pack saddle equipment for use with these guns has not yet been finally decided on. Trials to determine the best pattern of saddle are now being made.

Maxim guns for British infantry.

1897-98.

It was decided to carry out the re-armament of the British cavalry in India with the Lee-Enfield magazine carbine, and the artillery with the Martini-Enfield carbine, as funds became available.

Re-armament of British cavalry and artillery in India.

Pole draught is being substituted for shaft draught in batteries of horse and field artillery in India. Horse artillery batteries are also being equipped to take cordite cartridges with 12 pr. projectiles, while the field batteries are being altered to carry 15 pr. projectiles with cordite cartridges.

Equipment of horse and field artillery in India.

1898.

With a view to increased efficiency and economy of manufacture, the Ordnance factories have been placed under the immediate control of the Director-General of Ordnance in India.

Transfer of the Ordnance Factories to the direct control of the Director-General of Ordnance in India.

The experimental manufacture of cordite at Kirkee was successfully carried out, proving that cordite can be made in this country equal in standard to that produced in England. The question of the future manufacture of cordite in India on a large scale is now under consideration.

Manufacture of cordite in India.

The establishment of one central Gun-Carriage Factory, in place of the three existing factories, has been recommended to the Secretary of State, as conducive to economy as well as to efficiency in manufacture.

One Gun-Carriage Factory for all India.

COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT.

1896.

A committee assembled at Rawal Pindi to consider the scale of field service rations for British troops. The proposals of the committee are now under consideration. Another committee was held at Mian Mir to report on the scales of field service rations and clothing for native troops and followers.

Field service rations for British troops. Field service rations and clothing for native troops and followers.

Grass farms for
native cavalry.

New rules were introduced for the supply of grass for the horses of native cavalry regiments. Grass farms are provided at the expense of the State, but regiments have to cut and carry the grass.

1897.

Establishment of
dairies.

A model dairy was established at Umballa under the supervision of Veterinary-Major Kemp, for the supply of pure milk and butter to the hospitals and the troops at that station. If the experiment proves successful, it is proposed to establish similar dairies at the principal military stations in India.

Increase to
establishment of
Commissariat-
Transport officers.

The Commissary-General-in-Chief having again strongly represented the insufficiency of the existing complement of Commissariat-Transport officers, an increase to the establishment was recommended to the Secretary of State.

1898.

Improvement of the
system of collecting
Transport.

The improvement of the present system of collecting transport is engaging the attention of Government. A committee was held at Rawal Pindi early in 1897 to consider this important subject, and another committee, under the presidency of Lieutenant-General Sanford, is now sitting at Simla to investigate the question of improving the transport service in India in peace and war, in the light of the experience gained during the operations on the North-West Frontier in 1897-98. The report of the Committee is awaited.

CLOTHING.

1896.

Clothing of the
British soldier.

A new system for the supply of clothing to British troops in India was introduced from the 1st April 1896, the leading features of which are the general substitution of serge for cloth clothing, the division of clothing into "personal" and "public," and the grant of compensation in advance for articles of clothing not drawn when due. (Despatch to Secretary of State No. 141, dated 6th August 1895).

REMOUNT DEPARTMENT.

1896.

Reserve of horses.

The war reserve of 1,000 artillery horses, approved by the Secretary of State in 1892, was sanctioned, and that number of Australian horses was subsequently purchased.

1898.

Mule breeding.

With a view to developing mule-breeding in India, the purchase of additional donkey stallions from Cyprus was sanctioned.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

1894-95.

Reorganisation of
general and field
hospitals.

With a view to remedying defects brought to notice in recent expeditions, the organisation of general hospitals and field hospitals was altered and improved.

Military Assistant-
Surgeons.

The designation of the members of the Military Assistant-Surgeon Branch of the Indian Sub-Medical Department was changed and their position generally improved.

The conditions of service in the Army Hospital Corps were also improved, in order to make the service more attractive. Army Hospital Corps.

1895-96.

The Bengal, Madras and Bombay branches of the Indian Medical Service and Indian Sub-Medical Department were amalgamated, and the whole Indian Medical Service placed under the control of the Surgeon-General with the Government of India, whose designation was at the same time changed to that of Director-General, Indian Medical Service. Amalgamation of the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Branches of the Indian Medical Service.

SANITARY MATTERS.

1896.

Cantonment hospitals having failed to achieve the object for which they were established, were closed, and replaced by "station followers' hospitals" or out-door dispensaries. Abolition of cantonment hospitals.

1898.

The question of the re-establishment of cantonment hospitals under the new rules is now before the Government of India. Re-establishment of cantonment hospitals.

In order to investigate and combat the causes of disease among the troops and to give practical advice in all sanitary matters, three specially qualified sanitary officers were appointed, with their head-quarters at Lucknow, Rawal Pindi and Umballa. Sanitary Officers.

VI.—Military Finance.

1896.

Relief was afforded from the accumulated interest of the Patriotic Fund to the sufferers in the Chitral Relief Expedition, 1895. Relief from the Patriotic Fund to sufferers in the Chitral Expedition.

Orders were issued that the rates payable to British troops serving in India on account of compensation in lieu of clothing, and those recoverable from them on account of issues of clothing made on payment, should be identical; and that they should be fixed at the actual cost of supplying the articles in India. Previously, the Indian compensation rates followed the sterling rates of clothing compensation in force at home, under War Office orders; while the Indian recovery rates were based on the cost of supply in India. This system was found unsatisfactory, and liable in some cases to cause hardship to the soldiers, and in others loss to the State. Assimilation of the compensation and recovery rates in respect to issues of clothing.

1897.

Measures were adopted to obtain a more effectual check than formerly existed over claims to compensation for dearness of provisions and forage, to Native troops and followers, together with a simplification of procedure in the submission and audit of such claims. The changes made were mainly in the direction of securing that the prices accepted as the basis of such claims should more truly follow the local market rates, for the period concerned. Amendment of the orders relating to food and forage compensation.

1898.

Grant of messing allowance etc., to British troops in India.

In consequence of the grant by the Imperial Government to British soldiers serving in England and the colonies of a messing allowance of 3d. per diem, and gratuities on discharge or transfer to the Army Reserve, and the concurrent abolition of deferred pay, similar measures became necessary with regard to the British Army in India. Orders were accordingly issued with the approval of the Secretary of State, (1) notifying the abolition of deferred pay and the grant of a gratuity on discharge, as at home; (2) sanctioning the grant in India of a messing allowance of 2½ annas a day to European Non-Commissioned Officers and men, in addition to their usual pay and extra duty pay; and (3) exempting them from the payment of the stoppage of 9 pias a day hitherto made on account of the grocery ration.

Relief from the Patriotic Fund to sufferers in the Frontier War of 1897-98.

Measures were adopted for affording relief from the amount at credit of the Patriotic Fund (principal as well as interest) to the sufferers in the military operations on the North-West Frontier, 1897-98.

Military expenditure in India and military charges in England.

The following table shows the total military charges in India and England for the years 1893-94 to 1898-99 :—

	1893-94.	1894-95.	1895-96.	1896-97.	1897-98. (Preliminary actuals)	1898-99. (Estimates.)
	Rx.	Rx.	Rx.	Rx.	Rx.	Rx.
In India . . .	15,964,896	16,245,960	18,120,112	17,261,343	20,375,763	18,083,807
In England (exclusive of special defence works and exchange).	4,417,792	4,285,043	4,185,794	4,211,135	4,240,901	4,469,300
TOTAL RX. .	20,382,628	20,531,003	22,255,906	21,472,478	24,625,664	22,553,107

Comparison of the Army Expenditure of 1897-98 with that of 1893-94.

Army expenditure in India during 1897-98 compares with that during 1893-94, grant by grant, as under :—

		Expenditure of 1897-98, + (more) — (less) than that of 1893-94. Round figures. Rx.	
Grant	1—Army and Garrison Staff	+	10,000
"	2—Administrative Staff	+	4,000
"	3—Regimental Pay and Allowances	+	394,000
"	4—Commissariat Department	+	330,000
"	5—Remount Department	+	6,000
"	6—Clothing Department	+	3,000
"	7—Barrack Establishments and supplies	+	1,000
"	8—Martial Law
"	9—Medical Department	+	29,000
"	10—Ordnance Department	+	14,000
"	11—Ecclesiastical
"	12—Education	—	3,000
"	13—Sea Transport	+	3,000
"	14—Miscellaneous Services	+	3,632,000
"	15—Volunteers	+	8,000
"	16—Rewards for Military Services	+	8,000
"	17—Military Pensions—Europeans	—	16,000
"	18—Military Pensions—Natives	—	11,000
"	19—Widows' Pensions
"	20—Departmental Pensions	+	2,000

The increases in military expenditure during the period from 1894-95 to 1897-98, as compared with that in 1893-94, were mainly due to fall in the rate of exchange for payment of British troops; to larger payments of exchange compensation allowance; to the reorganisation of army commands and staff in India with effect from the 1st April 1895; to the grant of an increased rate of pay to men of the native army, including reservists; to a revised establishment of lance ranks in the British army; to the introduction of the new clothing scheme; to rise in the price of food for men and animals in consequence of the prevalence of scarcity or famine in 1896-97 and 1897-98; to expenditure to facilitate mobilisation arrangements; to the grant of increased rates of pay to medical officers; to certain concessions to British and native troops on the occasion of the "Diamond" Jubilee of Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, on completion of the Sixtieth year of Her reign; to the development of ordnance factories and manufactures in India; to field operations on the North-West Frontier; and to various minor changes in organization. These increases were partly counterbalanced by decreases due to the reduction of the British Infantry in India by one battalion, the remaining 52 battalions having been strengthened by 20 privates each; to the cost of certain native infantry regiments in East Africa while on service having been charged against Her Majesty's Imperial Government, London; to the reduction of the Burma garrison; to the services of certain officers and others having been placed at the disposal of the Civil Department for plague duty; and to the abolition of grass-cutters of British mounted corps in the Bengal and Punjab Commands.

The following are the principal measures which have caused variations of expenditure in 1898-99 :—

Increases.

- (1) The grant of an allowance called "Messing allowance," with effect from the 1st June 1898, to European non-commissioned officers and men of the regular forces in India, and also a gratuity on discharge or on transfer to the Army Reserve.
- (2) The provision in the estimates on account of field operations on the North-West Frontier.
- (3) The provision in the estimates, with the approval of the Secretary of State, for an increased establishment of Commissariat-Transport officers.

Decreases.

- (1) The absence from India of the 1st Bengal Infantry, sent to the Mauritius, and of the 27th Bombay Infantry and the head-quarters wing of the 4th Bombay Infantry, on service in East Africa.
- (2) The transfer of the Barrack Department, Madras, to the Military Works Department.

VII.—Military Legislation.

1894.

The Indian Articles of War (Act V of 1869) having been found defective in many respects, it was proposed that a new Act should be passed. A draft Bill was prepared and sent to the Secretary of State, but His Lordship having objected to the retention of the flogging clauses, the Bill was dropped.

Revision of the Indian Articles of War and retention of the punishment of flogging in the native army.

and a separate Bill making necessary amendments in Act V of 1869 was passed (Act XII of 1894). With regard to the punishment of flogging in the native army, the Government of India addressed the Secretary of State, strongly advocating the retention in the native army of corporal punishment, as having very great deterrent and disciplinary effect.

Repealing and
Amending Army
Act.

By the Repealing and Amending Army Act (Act XIII of 1894) certain amendments were effected in the Indian Statute Book, which were necessitated by the abolition of the Presidential Army system and the introduction of the four Command system.

1895.

Measures for
checking the spread
of venereal disease
in the British Army
in India.
Passing of Act V of
1895.
New rules under
the Cantonments
Act (XIII of 1889).

In consequence of the continuance of practices inconsistent with the resolution of the House of Commons dated the 5th June 1888, an Act (V of 1895) was passed by the Governor-General in Council on the 7th February 1895, providing for the prevention of the compulsory or periodical examination of any prostitute by medical officers for the purpose of ascertaining whether she is, or is not, suffering from venereal disease, and a fresh set of rules under the Cantonments Act (XIII of 1889) was published.

1896.

Amendment of the
Indian Volunteers'
Act (XX of 1869).

In March 1896 an Act to amend the Indian Volunteers' Act (XX of 1869) received the assent of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council. The chief provisions of this Act deal with—

- (1) The extended limits of local service of volunteers.
- (2) The power to call out volunteer corps for actual military service in cases of actual or apprehended emergency.
- (3) The grant of certain concessions to volunteers called out on actual military service, in the shape of pay, wound pensions, etc.

1897.

Record of
punishments in-
flicted by General
Officers
Commanding
Forces in the field.

In connection with a request of the Secretary of State for a list of the military executions which took place during the operations of the Chitral Relief Force in 1895, it was decided, after careful consideration, that a record should be kept, in a prescribed form, of all punishments inflicted by General Officers Commanding Forces in the field on persons not amenable to military or other law who commit offences against person or property, and that such offences should be tried, when practicable, under a simple form of judicial procedure.

Repeal of Act V,
1895.
New rules under the
Cantonments Act.

The increase of venereal diseases in the British army in India having been forcibly brought to notice, remedial measures became absolutely necessary. Act V of 1895 was repealed and revised rules under the Cantonments Act (XIII of 1889), providing for the treatment of venereal disease (which disease had been specifically omitted from the Rules of 1895) in cantonments, were issued. A notification was also issued explaining the policy of the new rules.

1897-98.

Cantonments
Regulations.

Under the authority of the Cantonments Act (XIII of 1889) rules have been drawn up for the administration of cantonments. These rules have been

published as a preliminary measure, and the remarks, objections, etc., thereon from residents in cantonments and from various local Governments, etc., have been received and are now being considered ; it is hoped that the rules as finally approved will shortly be promulgated.

1898.

Difficulties having frequently occurred in obtaining house accommodation in cantonments for officers of the army, and the existing rules on the subject having been found inadequate, it has been considered expedient to make better provision for that purpose by means of legislation. The Secretary of State has signified his approval of the draft Bill which was prepared for the purpose ; and the Legislative Department has been instructed to introduce the Bill into the Council of the Governor-General for making Laws and Regulations.

Cantonments
(House-
Accommodation)
Bill.

VIII.—Military Works and Defences.

In 1894, the Secretary of State having pointed out that the extension of the Military Works Department to the whole of India, which had been carried out in 1890, had led to a considerable increase in establishment charges, and having urged upon the Government of India the necessity of immediate steps being taken to keep the percentage of establishments to works within reasonable limits, a Committee was appointed, of which Mr. D. Lyall was President, to report as to what measures would be practicable and desirable for reducing the establishment charges and percentages in the Military Works and Public Works Departments, and as to the best means of effecting economy without interfering with efficiency in the execution of Military and Public Works. The report of the Committee was submitted in 1895, and it has been decided to order the reduction of the establishment of the Royal Engineer officers to be maintained in India from 350 to 300 ; to reorganise the administration of the Military Works Department on the basis of the system in force in the Imperial service at home and in the colonies, adapted to suit the recent reorganisation of the Army in India in four Commands ; and to revise the scale of pay of the officers of the Department, as part of a fair settlement of the distribution of responsibilities between the War Office and the Government of India in respect of the employment of Royal Engineers. It is intended that the reorganisation shall take effect from 1st April 1899.

Reorganisation of
the Military Works
Department.

The high level road through the Bolan Pass, which was commenced in 1882-83, was completed in 1896-97 at a cost of Rs. 21,79,464. Considerable progress has been made towards housing the troops in Upper Burma and Manipur. The necessary works in connection with the occupation of the Samana Range, Chitral, the Malakand, Wana and the Tochi Valley, are being pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and steps are being taken for the provision of special funds for the execution of all frontier defence works.

Various works
completed and in
course of
completion.

Special attention has been given to the subject of the water-supply of cantonments. The following water-supply projects have been carried through :—Karachi, Lansdowne, Lebong, Bangalore, Solon and Landi Kotal. Improvements have been made to the water-supply of the cantonments at Umballa,

Water-supply.

Murree and Chakrata, and schemes for pipe water-supply at Meiktila, Kirkee, Meerut, Subathu, Dugshai, Bareilly and Sialkot are in progress. The expenditure on these works from 1894-95 to 1898-99 amounts to Rs. 42,17,500.

**Military Works
expenditure.**

The expenditure on Military Works is shown below, the excess over the fixed allotment of Rx. 1,000,000 being due to extra grants provided for the requirements of Upper Burma and the frontier :—

	In India.	In England.	Exchange.	Total.
	Rx.	£	Rx.	Rx.
1894-95	962,203	24,972	20,776	1,007,951
1895-96	1,151,478	30,947	23,513	1,205,938
1896-97	1,115,942	24,725	16,339	1,157,006
1897-98	1,059,540	69,633	39,212	1,168,385
1898-99 (existing grants)	1,127,828	54,034	27,000	1,208,862
Total	5,416,991	204,311	126,840	5,748,142

The construction of the coast and frontier defences and the supply of armaments for them have been completed from the special defence grant, so far as contemplated at present,—the aggregate final outlay involved exhibiting a saving of about Rx. 250,000 on the estimate of Rx. 503,000.

**Expenditure on
special defences.**

The expenditure on special defences during the period under review has been as stated below :—

	In India.	In England.	Exchange.	Total.
	Rx.	£	Rx.	Rx.
1894-95	67,322	82,176	68,369	217,867
1895-96	21,716	45,252	34,381	101,349
1896-97	21,753	43,888	28,989	94,610
1897-98	—4,020	17,802	10,025	23,807
Total	106,771	189,098	141,764	437,633

IX.—Marine Matters.

1894.

**Floating defences
of India.**

In 1894 the turret-ships, gun-boats and torpedo boats of the Indian Harbour Defences (which had been transferred to the Royal Navy in 1892) were designated "Her Majesty's ships and vessels for the Naval Defence of India," but the Naval Commander-in-Chief was prohibited from removing them in time of peace from their allotted stations without the previous consent of the Government of India.

Authority was conferred on the Naval Commander-in-Chief to utilise these defence vessels in time of war to the best of his judgment, but it was reserved to the Governor-General in Council to withdraw the authority in cases of extreme urgency.

1895.

The question of the number and size of vessels to be furnished from the East Indian Squadron for the purposes of the Government of India, and the subsidy to be paid by India on account of these vessels was decided. India is to pay to the Admiralty £100,000 for four vessels, *plus* the cost of the repairs of the *Sphinx*, for a period of ten years commencing from the 1st April 1891.

Subsidised Royal Navy vessels.

1896.

Seven hired transports and three Royal Indian Marine vessels were employed to convey a force to Suakin.

Sea transport for troops ordered to Suakin.

1897.

On the 14th January 1897, during a pitch-dark night, the Royal Indian Marine troopship *Warren Hastings*, conveying troops from the Cape to the Mauritius and India, struck on the rocks near the village of St. Philippe, on the Island of Réunion, and was totally lost. The troops on board consisted of the head-quarters and four companies of the 1st Battalion of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, four companies of the 2nd Battalion of the York and Lancaster Regiment, and a detachment of the Middlesex Regiment, the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Forestier-Walker. The behaviour of the troops on this trying occasion was beyond praise; the most perfect discipline and calmness were maintained throughout; all orders obeyed without noise, confusion or hesitation; and this, combined with the coolness, courage and resource displayed by Commander Holland and the officers and crew of the ship, enabled the whole, troops and crew, to be landed with the loss of only two lives. The admirable conduct of the troops on this occasion was made the subject of a special Army Order by the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley.

Loss of the R. I. M. S. *Warren Hastings*.

1898.

Rear-Admiral Sir John Hext, K.C.I.E., vacated the Directorship of the Royal Indian Marine, having held the appointment for fifteen years.

Retirement of Rear-Admiral Sir John Hext.

Since 1892-93 no sea-going vessels have been added to the Royal Indian Marine. A number of small steam launches have, however, been brought on the Marine establishment. During 1894-95 the launches of the Sub-marine Mining Defences and other small craft in departmental charge were also transferred to the Marine Department. The following is a comparison of the cost of the Marine Department and of the work performed by it in 1892-93 and 1896-97 :—

Royal Indian Marine in 1892-93 and 1896-97.

	1892-93.	1896-97.
Net Marine expenditure	Rs. 16,65,090	Rs. 12,97,784
Value of work turned out	Rs. 18,38,526	Rs. 17,98,366
Value of stores issued on indent	Rs. 7,41,092	Rs. 7,19,584
Value of coal issued	Rs. 2,77,550	Rs. 1,97,013
Balance of stores in stock	Rs. 18,70,350	Rs. 18,27,682
Balance of coal in stock	Rs. 1,40,958	Rs. 63,608
Number of workmen employed daily	2,335	2,096
Tonnage of ships in the Marine	13,899	14,328
Miles run by ships during the year	177,407	194,673
Troops, etc., carried	67,577	48,232
Animals carried	13,459	5,841
Specie carried Lakhs	776½	134
Stores, etc., carried Tons	7,444	12,030

General improve-
ments.

Among matters of minor importance it may be noticed that revised rules for the conduct of Indian Marine Courts were published; as a temporary arrangement, consequent on the sale of the old Indian troopships, the home trooping has been conducted by hired transports; and the grant of commissions to officers of the Royal Indian Marine has been again recommended to the Secretary of State.

X.—Field Operations.

1893-94.

I.

Operations in the
Northern Chin Hills.

In the winter of 1893-94, an expedition was sent into the Northern Chin Hills, for the purpose of punishing the Siyin and Nwengal Chins for raids committed by them, to compel them to pay up the fines imposed on them after the operations of 1892-93, and to disarm them so as to lessen their powers of mischief for the future. The troops employed consisted of portions of the 10th and 30th Madras Infantry (1st and 5th Burma Battalions) amounting altogether to about 950 men, the whole under the command of Major Presgrave, 10th Madras Infantry. The forces, divided into several small columns, moved forward from Fort White on the 20th December, and continued in the field until April 1894, during which period the whole of the Siyin and Nwengal tracts were visited, and the people disarmed and brought into subjection. Although frequent skirmishes took place with small parties of the enemy, these satisfactory results were attained with but trifling loss on our side, only one native officer having been killed and one sepoy wounded.

1894.

II.

Operations in the
Southern Chin
Hills.

In January 1894, a small force, consisting of 150 men of the 12th Madras Infantry (2nd Burma Battalion) was sent into the Baungshe country, Southern Chin Hills, under the command of Captain Rainey, to coerce the village of Rawywa, and enforce the payment of tribute and of fines imposed in punishment for raids committed. The detachment marched from Haka on the 20th January and returned about the middle of the following month, having successfully and without experiencing much resistance accomplished the objects set before it.

III.

Expedition against
the Abors.

In January 1894, it was found necessary to despatch a punitive expedition against the Abors, a savage tribe inhabiting the hills to the north of Sadiya in Assam. The Abors had for several years been giving a good deal of trouble on the border, and their misconduct culminated on the 27th November 1893 in their ambushing and murdering three military police sepoy between the posts of Bomjur and Kherimpani. Such an outrage could not be overlooked, and it was decided to despatch an expedition against the villages implicated, which were ascertained to be Bomjur, Dambuk and Silluk, as well as several lying to the east of Bordak. The following force was detailed for the expedition :—

44th (Gurkha) Bengal Infantry . . .	100 men
Lakhimpur Military Police Battalion . . .	300 "
Naga Hills Military Police Battalion . . .	100 "

The expedition was essentially a police one, and was under the charge of Mr. J. F. Needham, Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya. The troops were under the command of Captain R. M. Maxwell, Commandant of the Lakhimpur Military Police Battalion.

The force crossed the Dibong River on the 15th January and occupied Bomjur, which was abandoned by the Abors without resistance. Leaving a detachment at this place, the force advanced on Dambuk on the 20th, and the same day a stockade erected across the road and occupied in strength by the enemy was captured after a smart fight, with a loss on our side of three killed and 28 wounded, the enemy suffering severely.

On the following day Dambuk was occupied without resistance. On the 26th the force returned to Bomjur, and on the 27th it moved on Silluk, which was occupied on the 28th, the strongly stockaded village of Munia Sipu having been captured *en route* with a loss on our side of two killed and seven wounded, all baggage coolies except one. Membu was occupied on the 10th, and Padu on the 18th February. On the 20th the force marched to Bordak in view to an advance to Damroh. At this place a subadar, a havildar and 15 sepoy (all sick and weakly men) and 44 public and private followers were left, together with a quantity of rations, which were to be sent on after the force as soon as some coolies, hourly expected, had arrived for the purpose of conveying them; and on the 22nd the force moved forward towards Damroh.

Three days later, on the 25th February, a band of two or three hundred Abors came down on Bordak, massacred almost the whole of the people left there, and looted the stores and rations.

The weather had now become unsettled, and continuous and heavy rain falling, the march towards Damroh was carried on under great difficulties. Considerable opposition was also experienced, but notwithstanding all difficulties the force arrived within a few miles of Damroh on the 27th; owing, however, to the total failure of supplies, the provisions left at Bordak not having been brought up in consequence of the massacre there, all further advance had to be abandoned, and on the 1st March the force retraced its steps to Bordak, which was reached on the 4th. Subsequently several offending villages were destroyed, and before the end of the month the force had returned to Sadiya.

Notwithstanding the failure to reach Damroh, the expedition was on the whole very successful, the Abors having been subjected to heavy losses both in men and property and taught a severe lesson. Our own losses during the operations, including those sustained in the Bordak massacre, amounted to 18 fighting men and 23 followers killed, and two officers, 25 fighting men and 18 followers wounded,—making a total of 86 casualties.

Since the termination of the operations the Abors have returned most of the arms carried off by them on the occasion of the Bordak massacre.

1894-95.

IV.

In accordance with the Treaty made at Kabul in November 1893, arrangements were set on foot in the autumn of 1894 for the delimitation of the Waziri-
 Afghan Boundary from Domandi on the Gomāl River to the Laram Peak on the borders of Khost. As the Mahsud-Waziris had during the preceding two years been guilty of many serious raids into the Gomāl and Zhob valleys, and were generally in an extremely aggressive mood, it was necessary that the

Operations in
Waziristan,
1894-95.

Boundary Delimitation Commission should be accompanied by a strong escort, and the following troops were accordingly detailed for that purpose, under the command of Brigadier-General A. H. Turner :—

No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery.
 No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
 A squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry.
 The 20th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.
 The 1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles.
 The 3rd Sikh Infantry.

At the same time the following troops were detailed to form a brigade in reserve, for the support of the escort should such a measure prove necessary :—

No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
 A squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry.
 The 2nd Battalion, Border Regiment.
 The 38th (Dogra) Bengal Infantry.
 The 4th Punjab Infantry.

The escort was concentrated at Dera Ismail Khan on the 1st October, and moved forward, in three detachments, about the middle of the month, to Kajuri Kach, where it was joined by the members of the Delimitation Commission on the 18th, and on the 27th, the whole force was concentrated in a camp near the Toi River in Wana.

From the time that the first troops arrived at Wana there had been repeated indications of Waziri hostility, and all needful precautions were therefore taken to secure the camp, though no attack in force was anticipated. Before daylight, however, on the morning of the 3rd November, a Mahsud Waziri *lashkar*, 3,000 strong, led by a fanatical *mulla* named Pawindah, taking advantage of the darkness and of the broken nature of the ground in the neighbourhood, made a sudden and desperate attempt to rush the encampment, and actually succeeded in penetrating it at several points. A severe conflict ensued, but in the end the enemy, after occasioning many casualties and doing much damage, were driven out of the camp at the point of the bayonet, and as day broke they began to make for the hills. The cavalry were instantly ordered out, and pursued the retreating Waziris for many miles towards the Inzar Kotal, cutting up large numbers of them.

The loss sustained by the escort in this conflict amounted to 45 (including one British officer) killed and 75 (including six British officers) wounded. In addition 48 Government mules were killed and 58 wounded, and 15 horses, 36 rifles and Rs. 3,000 in cash were carried off by the enemy. The loss of the Mahsuds amounted to above 600, of whom 350 were killed or afterwards died of their wounds.

The Waziris had, as before remarked, been giving much trouble for some years, and this unprovoked attack completed the measure of their offences. Before, however, sending a punitive expedition into the Mahsud country, it was decided to give the tribe a chance of making reparation, and accordingly they were called upon to surrender as hostages eighteen of the principal men engaged in the attack on our camp in Wana, to banish Mulla Pawindah, and to restore every horse, every rifle, and all the money carried off on the 3rd November; and it was announced that if these terms were not complied with by the 1st December (subsequently extended to the 12th December) measures would be taken to enforce them.

Pending a reply to the Government proclamation the following forces were organised for operations in Waziristan :—

1st (or Wano) Brigade.

No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery.	}	Under the command of Brigadier-General A. H. Turner.
No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.		
One squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry.		
The 2nd Battalion, Border Regiment.		
The 20th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.		
The 1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles.		
The 3rd Sikh Infantry.		

The 2nd (or Jandola) Brigade.

No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.	}	Under the command of Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, C.B.
One Maxim gun, manned by men of the Devonshire Regiment.		
No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.		
One squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry.		
One squadron of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry.		
The 33rd (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.		
The 38th (Dogra) Bengal Infantry.		
The 4th Punjab Infantry.		
The 1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.		

The 3rd (or Bannu) Brigade.

No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.	}	Under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel C. C. Egerton, D.S.O.
The 3rd Punjab Cavalry.		
The 1st Sikh Infantry.		
The 2nd Punjab Infantry.		
The 6th Punjab Infantry.		

The troops were designated the "Waziristan Field Force" and Lieutenant-General Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B., was appointed to the command of the whole.

The Mahsuds having failed to comply with the terms imposed by the Government of India, the three brigades were concentrated at Wana, Jandola and Mirian, respectively, on the 17th December, and on the same day the forward movement began, the 1st Brigade marching on Kaniguram, the 2nd on Makin, and the 3rd on Razmak. The objective points were reached in each case on the 21st December, without much opposition having been experienced. In the course of the following four weeks the troops, broken up into columns of varying strength, visited every part of the Mahsud country without meeting with any organised opposition, or in fact any opposition at all except from detached bands of the enemy who carried on a sort of guerilla warfare and caused a few casualties. The tribesmen on the other hand suffered considerable losses, a great number of their towers having been blown up and destroyed and almost all their sheep, goats and cattle captured. Realising at last that further contumacy would result only in their suffering still greater damage, the Mahsuds finally gave in their submission on the 21st January, and in the course of the following month complied fully with the terms imposed upon them.

The losses sustained by the British troops in the course of these operations amounted to only 2 men killed, and 2 officers and 20 men wounded.

The main portion of the troops were withdrawn from the Mahsud country shortly after the 21st January. Some of them were subsequently employed in support of the Delimitation Commission, but by the middle of March all had been withdrawn to cantonments except a small force (a mountain battery, a company of sappers and three regiments of native infantry) left in occupation of Wana, and another (a mountain battery, a company of sappers and four regiments of native infantry) which was placed in the Tochi Valley, to remain until the Delimitation Commission had finally completed their labours.

1895.

V.

Chitral Operations,
1895.

Nizam-ul-Mulk, the then Mehtar of Chitral, was murdered on the 1st January 1894, and his brother Amir-ul-Mulk declared Mehtar.

Amir-ul-Mulk was a dull-witted man, and the conduct of affairs remained in the hands of certain of his adherents, who having now tasted the sweets of power concluded it would be better to rule Chitral themselves in the name of Amir-ul-Mulk than share the spoils with Umra Khan, who was probably concerned in the conspiracy to murder Nizam-ul-Mulk. Instigated by them, Amir-ul-Mulk, believing himself to be ruler indeed, repudiated his engagements with Umra Khan. The latter, irritated by this proceeding, promptly invaded Chitral territory and laid siege to Kila Drosh, which fell into his hands in the course of a few days.

In the midst of these events Surgeon-Major Robertson, the British Agent, who had been absent at Gilgit, returned to Chitral, at which place Lieutenant Gurdon, the Assistant Agent, had hitherto been looking after the interests of the Government of India.

Matters appeared to be settling down when, towards the end of February, Sher Afzal, escaping from Kabul, joined Umra Khan. As Sher Afzal laid claim to the Mehtarship, this event placed the British Agent in a difficult position, especially as Sher Afzal sent him an insolent message to the effect that if he did not leave the Chitral Fort, which belonged to him (Afzal), Umra Khan could not be restrained from marching against him, and, supported by Umra Khan, supplemented the message by moving up from Kila Drosh towards Chitral. At this moment, too, it was discovered that Amir-ul-Mulk was meditating an act of treachery against the British Agent, who in this emergency promptly removed him from the Mehtarship, and temporarily recognised his younger brother, Shujah-ul-Mulk, as Mehtar, keeping possession of Amir-ul-Mulk's person in the fort at Chitral, which he determined to hold at all costs against Sher Afzal and Umra Khan. All the force he had available for this purpose amounted to 99 men of the 14th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry, and 300 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, the whole under the command of Captain C. P. Campbell.

On the 3rd March Sher Afzal and his *lashkar* arrived in the neighbourhood of the Chitral Fort. A detachment of 200 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles was sent out the same afternoon to observe the enemy's movements, and if possible drive him back; but the action which followed was not successful, and the detachment was compelled to retire into the fort, after having sustained a loss of 23 killed and 33 wounded, Captain Campbell and Captain Baird (mortally) being included amongst the latter. Sher Afzal now closely invested the Chitral Fort, and the siege began.

Under these circumstances the following force was organised for despatch through Swat, Bajaur and Dir for the purpose of coercing Umra Khan, relieving the Chitral Fort, and compelling Umra Khan and Sher Afzal to withdraw from Chitral territory :—

1st Brigade.

1st Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment.	}	Brigadier-General A. A. A. Kinloch, C.B., Commanding.
1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps.		
15th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry.		
37th (Dogra) Bengal Infantry.		

2nd Brigade.

2nd Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers.	}	Brigadier-General H. G. Waterfield, Commanding.
1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders.		
4th Sikh Infantry.		
Infantry of the Corps of Guides.		

3rd Brigade.

1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment.	}	Major General W. F. Gatacre, D.S.O., Commanding.
2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders.		
25th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.		
2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles.		

Divisional Troops.

15 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery.
 A Maxim gun, manned by a party from the Devonshire Regiment.
 Nos. 1, 4, and 6 Companies, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
 11th Bengal Lancers.
 Cavalry of the Corps of Guides.
 13th Bengal Infantry.
 23rd (Punjab) Bengal Infantry (Pioneers).

On the Line of Communications.

No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.	}	Brigadier-General A. G. Hammond, C.B., V.C., Com- manding.
1st Battalion, East Lancashire Regiment.		
29th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.		
30th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.		

Reserve Brigade.

1st Battalion Rifle Brigade.
 26th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.
 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles.
 2nd Battalion, 3rd Gurkha Rifles.

A Moveable Column, consisting of one native mountain battery and two battalions of Gurkhas, was also formed at Abbottabad under the command of Colonel Gaselee.

Major-General Sir R. C. Low, K.C.B., was appointed to command the force, which was designated the "Chitral Relief Force."

Subsequently the troops on the Line of Communications became the 4th Brigade of the force; Major-General Stedman was appointed to the charge of the Line of Communications under a new organisation; the Reserve Brigade was moved forward from Rawal Pindi to Mardan, and a second Reserve Brigade was formed at the former place.

At the same time Colonel Kelly, who, with his regiment, the 32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers), was engaged in road-making in the Gilgit Agency, was directed to assume military command in the Agency, and to make such dispositions and movements as he thought best for the object first in view, the relief of Chitral, though he was desired not to undertake any operations which did not offer a reasonable prospect of success.

While these arrangements were in progress and the siege of the Chitral Fort was proceeding, events of importance were occurring in other parts of the disturbed area, to which a brief reference is necessary.

Reshun.—Early in March a detachment (Bengal Sappers and Kashmir Rifles) under Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler were on their way from Mastuj to Chitral with a supply of ammunition. They reached Reshun on the 6th March, and rumours of the fighting at Chitral on the 3rd having reached Lieutenant Edwardes, he made a reconnaissance towards Parpish on the morning of the 7th, to make sure that the road was open before he advanced any further. The reconnoitring party was attacked by the enemy and had to fall back on Reshun, with the loss of one man killed and Lieutenant Fowler and several men wounded. At Reshun, where they had constructed a *sangar*, the party defended themselves vigorously for several days, sustaining several casualties and at the same time inflicting considerable loss on the enemy. At last, on the 13th March, the enemy opened negotiations, asserting that matters had been settled at Chitral and that all fighting had ceased, and eventually an armistice was agreed to. This however was treacherously violated by the enemy on the 15th, who succeeded in seizing Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler and capturing the remnants of the party, with the whole of the ammunition, etc., in their charge. The prisoners were first taken to the camp of the *lashkar* besieging Chitral, and afterwards to Umra Khan at Drosh. They were not ill-treated, and were eventually released by Umra Khan about the middle of April.

Koragh.—On the 6th of March Captain Ross, who was in command of a detachment (93 men) of the 14th Bengal Infantry (Sikhs) at Mastuj, on the Gilgit-Chitral road, received information that the detachment under Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler at Reshun were in danger of being attacked. He accordingly moved off to the assistance of those officers on the 7th, and leaving 33 men at Buni, advanced towards Reshun with the remaining 60 on the 8th. He was, however, attacked on the same day in a defile beyond Koragh; the detachment was surrounded, and eventually after three days' fighting it cut its way back to Koragh and Buni with heavy loss, Captain Ross and 46 men (besides an hospital assistant and 6 followers) having been killed, and Lieutenant Jones and 9 men wounded. The remains of the party held on at Buni until the 17th, when they were relieved from Mastuj and withdrawn to that place by Lieutenant Moberly.

Mastuj.—A detachment at Mastuj, commanded by Lieutenant Moberly, had also to sustain the weight of an attack from the enemy. This detachment

consisted of 48 men of the 14th Bengal Infantry, 228 of the 4th and 6th Kashmir Regiments and 50 Paniyali levy sepoys. The enemy (3,000 in number) appeared before this post on the 23rd March and kept up a series of desultory attacks until the 8th April, when the advance of Colonel Kelly's force compelled them to retreat, having sustained considerable losses, while they succeeded in wounding only one man of the garrison.

Defence of Chitral.—After the action of the 3rd March the fort at Chitral was closely invested by Sher Afzal and his adherents, the defence being conducted by Captain C. V. F. Townsend, commanding the British Agent's Escort, who had succeeded to the command on Captain Campbell being wounded. During the succeeding forty-six days the enemy kept up a more or less heavy fire, and made repeated attempts to storm the defences, but they were invariably repulsed with loss. The most serious of these attacks was made on the night of the 7th April, when the enemy succeeded in setting fire to one of the towers, and killed and wounded several of the garrison, the British Agent, Surgeon-Major Robertson, being among the latter. As a last resource the enemy took to mining, and succeeded in pushing a gallery up to one of the towers before they were detected. As there was no time to countermine, and the explosion might have been fatal to the further defence of the fort, it was determined to make a sortie and destroy the mine, if possible. Forty men of the 14th Bengal Infantry and 60 of the 4th Kashmir Rifles were told off for this purpose and placed under the command of Lieutenant Harley, and the sortie was made during the afternoon of the 17th April. It was completely successful; the enemy were surprised and after a short conflict driven off and the shaft of the mine blown up and destroyed, with a loss on our side of 8 killed and 13 wounded. In the course of the following day the enemy remained very quiet, as if paralyzed by the defeat of their attempt, and in the course of the night they raised the siege and fled, impelled thereto by news of the near approach of the force under the command of Colonel Kelly from the north and of the forces of the Khan of Dir from the south. The loss sustained by the garrison during this gallant defence, from the 4th March to the 18th April, amounted to 48 killed and wounded.

Colonel Kelly's Operations.—Colonel Kelly having made arrangements for the protection of Gilgit, Chilas, Bunji and Ramghat, left Gilgit for Chitral on the 23rd March, with a force consisting of two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery and 396 men of his regiment, the 32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers). He was subsequently reinforced by 40 Kashmir sappers and 150 levy men from Cherkila, Hunza, Nagar and Sai. He reached Ghizr on the 31st, and during the next few days succeeded in getting across the Shandur Pass (12,230 feet above sea-level), a truly arduous operation owing to the severity of the weather and the depth of the snow. On the 9th April the enemy, in a formidable position, attempted to stop his further progress at Chakalwat, but with a loss of only four men wounded, he drove them from their *sangars* and continued his advance, reaching Mastuj the same day. Reinforced by 100 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, Colonel Kelly advanced from Mastuj on the 13th April, and the same day drove the enemy from a strong position (believed by themselves to be impregnable) at Nisa Gol, inflicting on them a loss of 160 killed and wounded, while our own casualties amounted to no more than twenty. Continuing his onward movement Colonel Kelly reached Kila Drasan on the 14th April, and on the 20th encamped at Chitral, from which place, as above

related, the besieging *laskhar* had already fled on receiving intelligence of his near approach. Colonel Kelly had thus after a brief campaign accomplished the object for which our forces had been set in motion.

Operations of the Chitral Relief Force.—The concentration of the force under his command having been completed, Sir Robert Low advanced from Jalala on the 2nd April, the people of Swat and Bajaur having been previously warned by proclamation that our sole object in moving through their country was to put an end to the aggression of Umra Khan and Sher Afzal on Chitral territory, and to prevent its recurrence; that there were no hostile intentions against Swat and Bajaur; and that provided the people of these countries refrained from attacking our troops and from in any way impeding their march to the relief of Chitral, no hostilities would be undertaken against them on our part and no part of their territory permanently occupied by us; and that our troops would be withdrawn as soon as the object for which they were being moved towards Chitral had been accomplished.

Notwithstanding the assurances conveyed in this proclamation the Malakand Pass was strongly held, and the advance of Sir Robert Low's force was opposed with great determination when it moved up on the 3rd April. The pass was found to be precipitous and difficult, and the enemy who held it numbered some 12,000 men, but after a severe fight of over five hours' duration their position was taken by storm, with a loss on their side of 500 men, our own casualties amounting to 11 men killed, and 8 officers, 2 native officers, and 40 men wounded. On the following day an advance was made into the Swat Valley, and the enemy again defeated in an action near Khar, our losses amounting to only 2 men killed, and 2 officers and 16 men wounded, while that of the enemy was not less than 500. On the 7th the passage of the Swat river was effected after an action in which we had 12 killed and wounded, mostly men of the 11th Bengal Lancers, which regiment gallantly charged an immensely superior body of the enemy, killed a hundred of them, and pursued the rest for nine miles to the Katgala Pass. On the 11th Sir Robert Low with the 2nd Brigade reached the Panjkora river at Sado ferry, and on the following day the Guides Infantry were passed over to the right bank by a bridge which had been thrown across the stream: this bridge was, however, carried away early on the morning of the 13th by a sudden rising of the river, and the Guides were thus isolated, with a deep and rapid stream running between them and the rest of the force. The regiment had by some mistake moved up the Ushiri river into Bajaur; here it was heavily attacked by the enemy and, as the loss of the bridge prevented its being immediately reinforced, it was ordered to fall back on the Panjkora, where it would be under the protection of the guns on the left bank. The retirement was carried out with great skill, but several casualties occurred, and amongst others Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, commanding the Guides Infantry, was unfortunately killed. The regiment took up a position on the right bank, where it was reinforced in the course of the day by a company of the 4th Sikh Infantry and two Maxim guns, which were crossed over on rafts, but much firing was kept up by the enemy until the following day, and Captain Peebles, commanding the Maxim detachment of the Devonshire Regiment, was mortally wounded.

Our losses in this affair amounted to 4 killed, and 22 wounded; that of the enemy amounted to several hundreds.

On the 17th a further advance was made and the enemy (principally Mamunds and Salarzais) were defeated in a skirmish near Mamuzai, in which we had a few men wounded. The advance was continued on the succeeding days; on the 18th Mandah, the home of Umra Khan, was occupied without resistance, the Jandol Chief having fled and taken refuge in Afghanistan, and on the 20th Brigadier-General Gatacre, who had reached Barwa, was directed to push on rapidly to Chitral with 500 men, to rescue the garrison, which was believed to be in great straits.

The rest of the troops followed, but two days later more reassuring intelligence was received from Chitral, and Brigadier-General Gatacre's detachment was halted at Ashreth on the 27th. The same day Sher Afzal was brought in a prisoner by the Khan of Dir (who had been actively co-operating with the Chitral Relief Force, with the object of recovering his territory, of which he had been deprived by Umra Khan), and delivered up to Sir Robert Low, who had then reached Dir.

During these operations the casualties in the Chitral Relief Force amounted to 127 officers and men killed and wounded.

Sir Robert Low subsequently moved up to Chitral with part of the 3rd Brigade.

In the course of the next six months the troops which had been put into the field on account of the Chitral outbreak were gradually demobilised and withdrawn to cantonments, with the exception of a small force (two battalions of native infantry and a company of sappers, with two mountain guns and two Maxims) which was left in occupation of Chitral; and as it was found necessary to maintain our communication with that place by the Malakand-Dir route, it was decided to retain a hold on the Malakand Pass and on the Swat river crossing at Chakdara, and for this purpose a force was detailed consisting of one native mountain battery, a company of sappers and miners, a squadron of native cavalry and three battalions of native infantry.

VI.

In January 1895, a small expedition was sent against Thetta, a village in the Baungshe country, Southern Chin Hills, the people of which had been giving much trouble for some years and had been concerned in two raids in 1894. The troops employed consisted of detachments of the 10th and 31st Madras Infantry (1st and 6th Burma Battalions) and two guns of No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery, the whole under the command of Major Keary, and moved forward from Haka early in January. No resistance was experienced. The people of Thetta and other villages concerned in the raids submitted immediately on the appearance of the troops, and having disarmed the whole of the Chin country from Haka west to the Boinu, the force returned to Haka about the middle of February.

Expedition against
the Chins of Thetta.

1895-96.

VII.

Towards the end of 1895 a small expedition was sent against the Sana Kachins, to punish them for a series of raids into the Myitkyina district.

Expedition against
the Sana Kachins.

The forces employed consisted of 400 men drawn from the Myitkyina and Mogoung Police Battalions, and, organised in two columns, moved forward from Myitkyina and Mogoung in December 1895. During the following two months every part of the Sana Kachin country was visited and the raiders punished: the resistance experienced was small and one man killed was all the loss sustained in action, but Major Atkinson, who commanded the expedition, died of fever in the course of the operations. The expedition returned to Myitkyina in March 1896.

VIII.

Operations in the
Chin and Lushai
Hills.

In the winter of 1895-96, a force was sent into the Chin and Lushai Hills, for the purpose of disarming the Tashon and Naring Chins and of coercing Kairuma, a contumacious Lushai chief, who had set the civil authorities at defiance. The troops employed consisted of detachments of the 31st Madras Infantry (6th Burma Battalion) and of three Military Police battalions. The objects of the expedition were attained without much resistance, and the troops returned to their stations in March 1896.

1896.

IX.

Expedition to the
Wa country.

In March 1896, the Superintendent of the Northern Shan States found it necessary to visit the Wa country, and proceeded thither escorted by a body of Military Police under the command of Lieutenant H. G. Maxwell. From a very early period the movements of the Superintendent and his escort were strenuously opposed by the Was, and while they remained in the Wa country an almost daily series of skirmishes took place. The escort was out on this duty until the first week in April, and during this period sustained a loss of two killed and 22 wounded.

X.

Suakin Expedition.

At the end of March 1896, Her Majesty's Government intimated that there was a possibility of the Dervishes making a supreme effort against the Egyptian forces operating against them, by moving simultaneously in great force against Saukin and Akasheh, and that as the Egyptian Army was not strong enough to counteract both movements, it was requested that troops might be sent from India to hold Suakin while the Egyptian Army was operating on the Nile. The following corps were selected for this service:—

The 1st Bombay Lancers;
No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery;
No. 1 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners;
The 26th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry;
The 35th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry;

and the command was conferred upon Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, C. B., D. S. O. The strength of the brigade (which was accompanied by two native field hospitals and half a veterinary field hospital) was about 2,500 men.

The troops were despatched from Bombay towards the end of May, and reached Suakin early in June. They continued in garrison at that place (a battalion being detached to hold Tokar) until November and December 1896, when, their presence in the Eastern Soudan being no longer necessary, they were withdrawn to India.

1897.

XI.

In November 1896, a party of Tangkhul Nagas from the village of Somra Khalel (lying about two days' journey from the Manipur frontier) made a raid on the village of Shorafunghi, within the Manipur boundary, and killed four of the inhabitants. As this was not their first offence of the same sort it was decided to punish the Somra people, and a small expedition (150 men of the 44th Bengal Infantry, with 30 Manipuri police, the whole under the command of Captain F. Murray) was sent against them in February 1897. Somra was reached on the 10th February, and, as the enemy refused to submit and make reparation for their raids, the place was destroyed. Other villages, with their stores of wood and grain, were also burnt during the succeeding days, and the force returned to British territory on the 21st, bringing with them several headmen as prisoners.

Expedition against Somra.

XII.

In February 1897, it was found necessary to despatch a small expedition against the Apa Tanaungs, a tribe whose country lies about forty miles beyond the border of the Lakhimpur Division, Assam, who had made a raid into British territory in the preceding November, murdered several British subjects and carried others away as captives. The force employed (consisting of 300 men of the Lakhimpur Military Police Battalion, under the command of Captain Row) entered the hills early in February, and in a few days penetrated to the country of the offending tribe, who were speedily reduced to submission without fighting; the captives were all surrendered, and the villages concerned in the raid heavily fined. The expedition got back to Lakhimpur on the 21st February.

Expedition against the Apa Tanaungs.

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER WAR OF 1897-98.

XIII.

On the 10th June 1897, Mr. Gee, the Political Officer in the Tochi Valley, proceeded from Datta Khel to Maizar for the double purpose of realising a fine that had been imposed upon the Mada Khel section of the Darwesh Khel Warziris for the murder of one Honda Ram, Muharrir of Sherani, and of selecting a site for a levy post at some point between Sherani and Maizar. He was accompanied by an escort (under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny) consisting of—

Outbreak at Maizar, and operations in the Tochi Valley.

- 2 guns of No. 6 (Bombay) Mountain Battery ;
- 12 sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry ;
- 200 men of the 1st Sikh Infantry ;
- 100 men of the 1st Punjab Infantry ;

and reached Maizar about 9-30 A.M.

The Tochi Valley was at that time presumed to be in a state of peace ; the people of the villages appeared to be perfectly friendly, and there was no reason to anticipate any outbreak or disturbance. Nevertheless, early in the afternoon, while the escort were peacefully reposing under the trees, a sudden, unprovoked, and treacherous attack was made on them by about a thousand Mada Khels of Maizar and the neighbouring villages, and Colonel Bunny and almost all the British officers were shot down at the first fire. The escort made a heroic resistance and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy, but they were overpowered by

numbers and compelled to fall back towards Datta Khel. Eventually they were able to take up a good position and hold on there until late in the evening, when reinforcements and ammunition arrived from Datta Khel, having covered the nine miles from that place in one hour and a half. Soon after the enemy began to disperse, and the detachment encamped near Sherani, having sustained a loss of 24 killed and 30 wounded, including the whole of the British officers, of whom one was killed on the spot, two died of their wounds before evening, and two others succumbed at a later period, leaving only one survivor, and he severely wounded.

To punish the perpetrators of this unprovoked outrage and prevent the further spread of disturbances, a force, which was designated the "Tochi Field Force," was immediately formed and sent into the Tochi Valley under the command of Major-General G. C. Bird, C.B. It was organised as follows:—

1st Brigade.

No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery.	} Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding.
No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.	
1st Punjab Cavalry (one squadron).	
2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.	
33rd (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.	
1st Sikh Infantry.	
1st Punjab Infantry.	

2nd Brigade.

No. 6 (Bombay) Mountain Battery (four guns).	} Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, C.B., Commanding.
1st Punjab Cavalry (one squadron).	
3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade.	
6th Bengal Infantry.	
14th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry.	
25th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.	

The troops were concentrated at Datta Khel early in July, and on the 20th of that month the 1st Brigade moved forward to Sherani. The fortified *kots* at that place were destroyed on the 21st, and those at Maizar on the 22nd. The 2nd Brigade subsequently moved up, and in the course of the next three months every part of the valley, up to the Afghan frontier, was visited and the villages of the recalcitrant tribesmen destroyed. A few trifling skirmishes took place, but practically the enemy, though for a long time they obstinately refused to make submission, made no opposition, mostly confining themselves to distant firing on reconnoitring parties and to firing into camp at night. Eventually, however, the incessant moves into all parts of their country, which harassed them beyond measure, and the destruction of their houses, wore out the Mada Khels, and towards the end of October they finally gave in; certain of the headmen whose surrender had been demanded gave themselves up, much of the property looted was restored, and the fines imposed were paid.

The losses in action sustained by our troops and followers during these operations amounted to only 8 killed and 15 (including one British officer) wounded. The losses by disease were, however, far heavier,—3 British officers, over 100 British soldiers, besides 50 native soldiers and many followers having fallen victims to the unhealthiness of the Tochi Valley, without reckoning several hundreds that had to be invalided.

Some of the more sickly corps in the Tochi Valley were relieved in November and December, and in January 1898 the field force was broken up, the following reduced force being retained for the continued occupation of the Valley :—

Four guns of a native mountain battery.

Two squadrons of native cavalry.

Four battalions of native infantry.

Four Maxim guns.

This force has since been still further reduced.

XIV.

The outbreak in the Tochi Valley was only a prelude to a series of Attack on the Malakand position, and operations in the Swat Valley. fanatical risings, which eventually enveloped the whole of the North-West Frontier, from Buner to Waziristan, in a sanguinary war. The troops detailed to suppress the Tochi disturbances had scarcely taken the field when a sudden fanatical outburst, headed by one Saidulla, an insane *mulla*, took place in the Swat Valley. There had been for a short time before a simmering excitement in the valley owing to the preaching of the fanatic above referred to, but no outbreak was expected when, during the afternoon of the 26th July, a fanatical host of several thousand Ranizais, Utman Khels and Bunerwals suddenly appeared, enveloped the fort of Chakdara and advanced against the Malakand position.

Defence of the Malakand position.—The troops then holding the Malakand position were under the command of Colonel Meiklejohn and consisted of—

No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery,

No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners,

A squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers,

The 24th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry,

The 31st (Punjab) Bengal Infantry,

The 45th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry,—

Chakdara being garrisoned by two companies of the 45th Bengal Infantry and 20 men of the 11th Bengal Lancers, the whole under the command of Lieutenant Rattray of the former regiment; on the following day, however, the post was reinforced by Captain Wright and 40 men of the Lancers from the Malakand, who forced their way through the enemy with great gallantry and judgment.

The first attack of the enemy on the Malakand position, during the night of the 26th July, was of a most furious and desperate character, and they succeeded in overwhelming one of the picquets and penetrating into the enclosure. The fighting was severe and continuous, but our troops, though hard-pressed, succeeded in maintaining their position, and at day-light on the 27th the enemy retired. Our losses during the engagement amounted to 22 killed and 36 wounded, including several officers. In the course of the day the Corps of Guides (Cavalry and Infantry) reached the Malakand, having been called up from Mardan as soon as the hostile gathering revealed itself in the Swat Valley; but notwithstanding this reinforcement Colonel Meiklejohn found himself under the necessity of abandoning the North Camp and concentrating his troops on the Malakand Kotal.

On the night of the 27th the enemy returned to the attack, and for several hours kept up a heavy fire and made desperate efforts to rush the position, but every attempt was foiled, except at one point, where they succeeded in capturing

a fortified *serai* held by a subadar and 25 men of the 31st Bengal Infantry, who did not, however, relinquish their post until 20 of their number had been killed and wounded. At day-light on the 29th a counter-attack was made by a part of the garrison and the enemy driven off, but not before they had inflicted on us a loss of 11 killed and 46 wounded.

During the 29th the garrison was reinforced by a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, and at night the enemy again advanced and made a series of desperate assaults on the position; but every attack was repelled, and at 3 A.M. on the 30th the enemy withdrew once more, our losses during the night having been only one killed and 18 wounded. On this occasion the mad *mulla* who had headed the rising was severely wounded, and his second-in-command killed.

On the 30th the enemy were largely reinforced, and at night once more advanced to the assault: but the attack was not made with spirit and was easily repulsed, our losses amounting to no more than two men wounded. This was the last attempt of the hostile gathering to force the Malakand position, and on the morning of the 31st the defending force was strengthened by the arrival of the 35th (Sikh) and the 38th (Dogra) Bengal Infantry, which had been hurried up from Peshawar and Nowshera immediately on the outbreak of disturbances. The same day Brigadier-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., arrived and assumed the command.

On the 1st August an attempt was made to relieve the fort of Chakdara, which had in the meantime been closely besieged by the enemy, and was now in great straits. The force detailed for this purpose moved from the Malakand at noon, but (the enemy having collected in large numbers to oppose them, and the day being too far advanced) it was eventually decided to put off the attempt until the next morning, and the force was accordingly recalled after the cavalry (Guides and a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers) had had a smart engagement with the enemy, of whom a great number were slain, our own losses amounting to only one killed and 14 wounded. Accordingly, at dawn on the 2nd August, a force consisting of four guns, 50 sappers, four squadrons of cavalry and a thousand rifles from the 24th and 45th Bengal Infantry and the Guides—the whole under the command of Colonel Meiklejohn—advanced towards Chakdara. Some fighting took place, in which the enemy suffered severely, but the Amandara Pass was seized before noon, and advancing thence rapidly Colonel Meiklejohn reached Chakdara early in the afternoon; aided by a well-timed sortie from the fort, he drove off the Pathan host with heavy loss, and relieved the garrison. The loss of the relieving force amounted to five killed and 28 wounded.

Defence of Chakdara.—As already related the enemy had enveloped the fort of Chakdara on their first appearance in the valley on the 26th July. During the succeeding night they made three vigorous attempts to carry the place by storm, but each attack was repulsed with loss. On the 27th the garrison was reinforced by 40 men of the 11th Bengal Lancers under Captain Wright, who now assumed the command, and the same night the enemy made two more attempts on the place, which were again repelled with heavy loss. On the 28th and 29th the attacks were repeated with largely increased numbers, the efforts of the enemy on the latter occasion being principally directed to the capture of the Signal Tower, but every attempt was defeated, as was another attack on the 31st. On the 1st August the difficulties of the little garrison, which had suffered terribly from these continual attacks and the consequent

want of rest, were greatly increased, the enemy appearing in larger numbers than ever, armed with rifles. Having possessed themselves of a ridge within 150 yards of the fort they cut off all communication with the Signal Tower and secured command of the whole of the northern and western sides of the fort; they maintained a heavy fire, and, though no attempt at assault was made, they kept every man at his post, though all were worn out with fatigue, and the sufferings of the gallant band in the Signal Tower from the want of water became very severe.

On the 2nd August the enemy made another desperate attempt to take the place, advancing in overwhelming numbers with scaling ladders, but all their attempts were foiled. The garrison were, however, extremely hard pressed when the advance of the relieving force was observed and the enemy began to retire. Collecting a few men Lieutenant Rattray made a bold sally and drove the enemy from one of their positions, and soon after the advance of Colonel Meiklejohn's force compelled them to withdraw altogether, the cavalry of the relieving force cutting up large numbers of them. In this heroic defence the garrison lost only five men killed and one officer and ten men wounded.

The total loss of the Malakand Brigade during the fighting from the 26th July to the 2nd August amounted to one British officer and 32 men killed, and 13 British officers, seven native officers, and 169 men wounded—222 in all. The loss of the tribesmen was very heavy, their killed alone being estimated at three thousand.

Formation of the Malakand Field Force and Reserves.—Immediately on the receipt of news of the attack on the Malakand position and of the formidable nature of the outbreak, instructions were issued for the formation of a force (which was designated the "Malakand Field Force") for the purpose of supporting the Malakand and neighbouring posts and of carrying out such operations as might be necessary against the insurgent tribes. For this force (to the command of which Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., was appointed) the following corps were detailed :—

1st Brigade.

1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment.	} Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., Commanding.
24th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.	
31st (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.	
45th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry.	

2nd Brigade.

1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment.	} Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C.B., Commanding.
35th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry.	
38th (Dogra) Bengal Infantry.	
Infantry of the Corps of Guides.	

Divisional Troops.

No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
 No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
 No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
 11th Bengal Lancers (one squadron).
 Cavalry of the Corps of Guides.

Most of these troops were already at the Malakand Pass. Such as were not were directed to proceed to Nowshera and march thence to Malakand as speedily as possible.

A few days later a Reserve Brigade of all arms was formed, to be in readiness to support the Malakand Field Force. It was placed under the command of Brigadier-General J. H. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G., and was composed of the following units :—

The 10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
 The 2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry.
 The 1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders.
 The 21st (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.
 The 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles.

Subsequently, the development of affairs having necessitated the strengthening of the Malakand Field Force, the following corps were detailed to join it as quickly as might be possible :—

The 10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
 A squadron of the 10th Bengal Lancers.
 The remaining squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers.
 Two companies of the 21st (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.
 The 22nd (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.

Further, to meet possible eventualities, two more Reserve Brigades of all arms were formed at Rawal Pindi. They were composed as follows :—

2nd Reserve Brigade.

No. 2 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 4 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
 18th Bengal Lancers.
 2nd Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment.
 2nd Battalion, Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
 12th Bengal Infantry.
 1st Battalion, 3rd Gurkha Rifles.

Brigadier-General R. Westmacott,
 C.B., Commanding.

3rd Reserve Brigade.

The 3rd Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 4 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
 3rd Bengal Cavalry.
 1st Battalion, Dorsetshire Regiment.
 1st Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment.
 9th (Gurkha) Bengal Infantry.
 1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkha Rifles.

Brigadier-General A. G. Yeatman-
 Biggs, C.B., Commanding.

Further operations in Swat.—Having completed and organised the field force under his command during the first week of August, Sir Bindon Blood prepared to move into Upper Swat for the purpose of punishing the clans implicated in the attack on the Malakand. Heavy rain delayed the advance for a day or two, but on the 16th August, proper provision having been made for holding the Malakand and adjacent posts and the line of communications, the force detailed for the operations in Upper Swat marched to Thana, with the object of forcing a strong position at Landakai (the gate of Upper Swat) which it was anticipated would be held in force by the enemy, as in fact it was. The attack was delivered on the morning of the 17th : demoralised by the fire of the 10th Field Battery, the enemy made but a feeble resistance and the position

was carried with a trifling loss of seven men wounded; in the pursuit, however, the cavalry came under a heavy fire in unfavourable ground near Nawa Kili, and two officers were unfortunately killed and two wounded.

During the succeeding ten days the force under Sir Bindon Blood visited every part of the Upper Swat valley. No opposition was experienced, and indeed the country was found to be almost entirely deserted. Advantage was taken of the opportunity to push a reconnaissance up the Karikar pass, leading into Buner; a good view of the country was obtained, but no further advance in that direction was made. While these operations were proceeding the Bunerwals had been effectually kept in check by the advance of the Reserve Brigade under Brigadier-General Wodehouse (which was now become the 3rd Brigade of the Malakand Field Force) to Rustam, within four miles of the Buner border; but the punishment of these tribesmen, for their share in the attack on the Malakand, was, on political grounds and also in consequence of events on other parts of the frontier which required more immediate attention, relegated to a more favourable opportunity.

On the 27th August the force under Sir Bindon Blood returned to Thana in Lower Swat.

XV.

The Mohmands were the next to become affected by the wave of excitement on the North-West Frontier. Stirred up by a fanatical *mulla*, known as the Adda Mulla, and reinforced by large bands of Utman Khels, Mullagoris and people (Khugianis, Shinwaris and Basawal and Hazarnao Mohmunds) from the Afghan side of the border, they came down on the fort of Shabkadar on the 7th August to the number of nearly 9,000 men. Shabkadar was then held by a small detachment (about 50 men) of Border Military Police, and these easily repelled a feeble attempt made on the place; but repulsed at the fort the insurgents turned on the village of Shankargarh, lying under its walls, which they completely sacked and burnt, killing several of the inhabitants.

Attack on Shabkadar by the Mohmands, and action near that place.

Directly intelligence was received at Peshawar that the Mohmands were actually coming down on Shabkadar, Brigadier-General Elles, commanding there, sent out a detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Woon, 20th Bengal Infantry, for the protection of the place. The detachment (which consisted of four guns of the 51st Field Battery, two squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers, two companies of the Somersetshire Light Infantry, and the 20th Bengal Infantry) marched from Peshawar early on the morning of the 8th August, and was concentrated at Shabkadar in the course of the day. Moving out on the morning of the 9th, Colonel Woon found the enemy, in position on an undulating plateau at the foot of hills to the west of the fort. He immediately attacked and a hot engagement ensued, but the enemy having made a determined effort to turn his left flank, he was compelled to fall back to prevent the tribesmen getting between him and the fort. At this moment General Elles arrived on the field and found our small force completely outflanked and exposed to a heavy fire. Taking the direction of affairs into his own hands he immediately brought the guns into action again and extended the infantry to the left, while the cavalry were sent to the right flank, with orders to charge along the enemy's front and double up his line. Covered by the fire of the artillery, the cavalry executed a brilliant charge for a mile and a half over stony and difficult ground, and completely cleared the enemy from the front, while the infantry

and guns simultaneously advanced, reinforced by two companies of the 30th Bengal Infantry, which had just arrived on the ground. The enemy thereupon relinquished the engagement and quickly retired into the hills, whither it was not considered desirable to follow him.

Our losses during this engagement amounted to eight killed and 68 (including four British officers) wounded. The enemy suffered very severely, their killed alone amounting to nearly 300.

The measures taken to punish the Mohmands for this unprovoked aggression will be related further on.

XVI.

Afridi and Orakzai
rising and attack
on the Khaibar and
Samana posts.

Almost simultaneously with the Mohmand attack on Shabkadar, the Afridi and Orakzai clans rose against us. No overt act of aggression was, however, committed until towards the end of August, when, on the 23rd of that month, the Afridis, in great force, broke into the Khaibar, and overcoming the resistance of the Khaibar Rifles, captured in succession the posts of Fort Maude, Jehangira, Ali Musjid and Landi Kotal, and possessed themselves of the whole pass. At Landi Kotal the detachment of the Khaibar Rifles there stationed made for two days a gallant stand against the enemy, on whom they inflicted heavy loss, but eventually on the 26th August, they were compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and evacuate the position. At the same time some of the Orakzai clans came down in great numbers through the Ublan Pass near Kohat, the Massuzai Orakzais and Chamkannis advanced into the Kuram Valley, and a combined gathering of Afridis and Orakzais threatened the posts on the Samana Range.

On receipt of the first intelligence regarding the excitement amongst the Afridis and Orakzais and of the probability of an attack on the Samana and Kuram posts, the garrison of Kohat was promptly reinforced by the 9th Field Battery, the 18th Bengal Lancers, a wing of the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the 15th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry. A few days later, as events began to develop, the 3rd Field Battery, No. 4 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners, the 3rd and 6th Bengal Cavalry, the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Irish Regiment, the 12th and 30th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry and the 1st Battalions of the 2nd and 3rd Gurkha Rifles were also sent to Kohat; and a Moveable Column,—consisting of four guns of No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, the 18th Bengal Lancers, two squadrons of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, the 15th Bengal Infantry and the 5th Punjab Infantry,—was pushed on to Hangu. At the same time large reinforcements were pushed on to Peshawar.

Affair in the Ublan Pass.—On the night of the 26th August an Orakzai *lashkar* came down through the Ublan Pass and captured the Mahomedzai police post, killing and wounding several of the police. At 4 A.M. on the following morning Brigadier-General Yeatman-Biggs, commanding the Kohat-Kuram forces, moved out from Kohat with—

The 9th Field Battery, Royal Artillery,
The 3rd Punjab Cavalry (one squadron),
The 2nd Punjab Infantry,
The 1st Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers (two companies),

and at daybreak attacked the enemy, who had taken up a position on the pass; after a sharp engagement the enemy were driven through the pass with consi-

derable loss and retreated across the Bara river, whither it was not considered advisable to follow them, and the detachment then returned to Kohat, having sustained a loss of 2 men killed, and 2 British officers, 2 native officers and 7 men wounded.

Attack on the Samana posts.—On the same day that the affair with the Orakzais occurred in the Ublan Pass, near Kohat, a still larger gathering of the same clan (four thousand strong) appeared on the Samana Range and attacked the posts there, some of which, having been evacuated by the Border Police, were burnt by the enemy. A part of the Moveable Column (two guns of the Derajat Mountain Battery, a troop of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, the 15th Bengal Infantry, and a wing of the 5th Punjab Infantry), under Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott, moved out from Hangu to the relief of the Border Police posts of Lakka and Saifuldara, and engaged and defeated the enemy, sustaining a loss of two killed and three wounded. Some desultory skirmishing took place during the next few days at Shinaori, Fort Lockhart and Gulistan, and on the 3rd September the enemy retired, our losses during these days aggregating (excluding those of the Moveable Column) only one man killed and Lieutenant Blair and six men wounded, all of the 36th Bengal Infantry, the only regiment then on the Samana Range.

Defence of the Samana.—A few days later, on the 11th September, the Orakzais, reinforced by large numbers of the Afridis, the combined *lashkars* amounting to over 10,000 men, again advanced to the attack of the Samana, and on that and the following three days enveloped and hotly assailed every post on the range. These (Fort Lockhart, Gulistan, Sangar, Dhar and Saragarhi) were all most gallantly defended, and all made good their defence except the small post of Saragarhi, which was taken by the enemy on the 12th after an obstinate conflict and the entire garrison (a havildar and 20 men of the 36th Bengal Infantry) put to the sword. These gallant soldiers displayed in the defence a heroic tenacity which has never been surpassed in the annals of the Indian Army, and died devotedly at their posts. The conflict on the ridge did not cease until the 14th, when a relieving force under the command of Brigadier-General Yeatman-Biggs arrived and drove them off. During these four days of conflict the enemy sustained heavy losses: that of the gallant 36th amounted to 21 men killed (all at Saragarhi) and one native officer and 39 men wounded.

Relief of the Samana posts.—On receipt of intelligence that the enemy were advancing for the purpose of renewing their attack on the Samana posts, Brigadier-General Yeatman-Biggs, taking with him a month's supplies for these posts, moved out from Hangu on the 9th with the following troops :—

- The 9th Field Battery, Royal Artillery (four guns).
- Half of No. 4 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
- The 3rd Bengal Cavalry (two squadrons).
- The 3rd Punjab Cavalry (one squadron).
- The 2nd Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment (four companies).
- The 1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkha Rifles.
- The 1st Battalion, 3rd Gurkha Rifles.
- The 2nd Punjab Infantry.

The artillery and cavalry were sent back from Pat Darband, and the supplies having been seen safe into Fort Lockhart and the defences of Gulistan improved, the force was moved on the 11th (after some skirmishing on the Gogra hill, in

which the enemy lost more than 100 men in killed and wounded) to Lakka, in order to cover Hangu and Shahu Khel, for which points the enemy were believed to be making. From this place the troops were about to march back to Hangu when, late in the afternoon of the 12th, a heliograph was received from Fort Lockhart that Saragarhi and Gulistan were hard pressed by overwhelming numbers of the enemy, and again that Saragarhi had fallen; and on the following day a request for help came from Gulistan. Some troops (four guns of the 9th Field Battery, the 3rd Bengal Cavalry and a squadron of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry) were at once sent out to make a demonstration towards Gulistan, and early on the following morning the force under Brigadier-General Yeatman-Biggs moved up and, after sharp engagements at Tsalai and Gogra hill, drove the enemy from before the Sangar and Dhar posts. Fort Lockhart was reached at 10 A.M., and shortly after an advance was made for the relief of Gulistan, which was still invested by 6,000 Orakzais. Demoralised by the fire of the artillery, the enemy did not wait for the infantry, but retreated in haste into the Khanki Valley. During these operations the relieving force sustained a loss of 7 men killed and one British officer and 11 men wounded.

Affairs in Kuram.—Simultaneously with the first attack on the Samana posts the Massuzai Orakzais and the Chamkannis broke into the Kuram Valley. At this time our troops in the valley (known as the "Kuram Escort") consisted of only two guns of No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, a detachment of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, a wing of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Gurkha Rifles, a small detachment of the 36th Bengal Infantry, and the local Kuram Militia. The reports from beyond the frontier had shown for some time before that such an invasion was very probable, and the troops then on the spot being quite inadequate to meet it, as soon as the arrival of reinforcements at Kohat rendered arrangements possible, a flying column was detached into the valley for the purpose of repelling incursions and preserving order. This force, which was under the command of Colonel Richardson, 18th Bengal Lancers, was composed of the following corps:—

- No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery (four guns).
- No. 4 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners (half).
- The 18th Bengal Lancers.
- The 15th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry.
- The 5th Punjab Infantry.

On the 30th August a part of this force advanced to Doaba under Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott, 15th Bengal Infantry, and found the enemy there in some strength; they, however, retreated on the appearance of the detachment. The column subsequently pushed up the Kuram Valley, and Alizai and Sadda were occupied on the 2nd September. Some skirmishing took place, and on the night of the 16th-17th September a determined attack was made on Colonel Richardson's camp at Sadda by a force of about 2,000 Massuzais and Chamkannis. The attack was pushed home with much spirit, but was easily repulsed by the corps engaged (15th Bengal Infantry, 5th Punjab Infantry, and 1-5th Gurkha Rifles), and at day-light the enemy retired, having suffered considerable loss, our own casualties amounting to only a few men killed and wounded. Some occasional firing took place on subsequent days, but later the Massuzais and Chamkannis returned home to reap their crops, and there was quiet in the valley during the next month.

Affairs on the Peshawar Border.—The garrison of Peshawar was, in consequence of the state of affairs on the frontier, largely reinforced. Some skirmishing took place at the mouth of the Khaibar Pass and at other points on the border, and the posts of Jamrud and Bara, on which attacks were threatened, were reinforced; but partly for military and partly for political reasons, measures for the recovery of the Khaibar and for the punishment of the Afridis for their unprovoked acts of aggression were deferred to a later period.

XVII.

The measures adopted to punish the Mohmands for their unprovoked descent on Shabkadar constituted the next act in the drama of the Frontier War of 1897. It had been intended to defer these measures until after the country of the Utman Khels had been visited and the clan punished for their share in the attack on the Malakand, for which purpose a small force under Brigadier-General Jeffreys had actually been put in motion, but the intelligence that the Adda Mulla with a large gathering was advancing against Dir and threatening our line of communication with Chitral, rendered it imperative that the *mulla* and the Mohmands should be crushed as a preliminary to any other operations. It was accordingly decided to move two brigades of all arms of the Malakand Field Force into the Mohmand country at once under the command of Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., and to detail a force of two brigades (to be styled the "Mohmand Field Force") to move up from Peshawar by way of Shabkadar, to co-operate with Sir Bindon Blood from the south, the whole to come under the command of the latter officer when the two forces, operating from opposite directions, should come into communication.

The force detailed to operate under Sir Bindon Blood was composed of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of the Malakand Field Force, which were now constituted as follow :—

2nd Brigade.

No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
11th Bengal Lancers (two squadrons).
1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment.
35th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry.
38th (Dogra) Bengal Infantry.
Infantry of the Corps of Guides.

Brigadier-General P. D.
Jeffreys, C.B., Command-
ing.

3rd Brigade.

No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
11th Bengal Lancers (two squadrons).
1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment.
22nd (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.
39th (Garhwal) Bengal Infantry.

Brigadier-General J. H.
Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G.,
Commanding.

The Mohmand Field Force, the command of which was conferred upon Major-General E. R. Elles, C.B., was organised as follows :—

1st Brigade.

1st Battalion, Somersetshire Light Infantry.
20th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.
2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles.

Brigadier-General R. West-
macott, C.B., D.S.O., Com-
manding.

2nd Brigade.

2nd Battalion, Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
 9th (Gurkha) Bengal Infantry.
 37th (Dogra) Bengal Infantry (six companies.)

} Brigadier-General C. R.
 Macgregor, D.S.O., Com-
 manding.

Divisional Troops.

No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 5. (Bombay) Mountain Battery.
 Three Maxim guns, with detachments of the 16th (The
 Queen's) Lancers and the Devonshire Regiment.
 No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
 13th Bengal Lancers.
 28th Bombay Infantry (Pioneers).
 1st Patiala Infantry, Imperial Service Troops.

Operations of the Malakand Field Force in Bajaur.—On the 12th September the 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Jeffreys, was at Gosam, and the 3rd under Brigadier-General Wodehouse (with which was Sir Bindon Blood) at Watelai, near Khar, in the Chaharmang Valley. On the 13th the advance was begun, the 2nd Brigade moving to Khar; on the 14th it moved to Markhanai, occupying the Rambat Pass, and on the same day Sir Bindon Blood reached Nawagai. At this point, however, a new element was introduced into the operations by a large gathering of the Mamund tribe suddenly attacking Brigadier-General Jeffreys' camp at Markhanai on the night of the 14th. The attack was easily repulsed and many of the enemy cut up by the cavalry on the following morning, with trifling loss on our side, the total number of casualties being only 11 (including two British officers killed and one dangerously wounded, who afterwards died), but this attack rendered it necessary to undertake operations against the Mamunds and to a certain extent deranged the plan of campaign, Sir Bindon Blood being now compelled to stand fast at Nawagai until Brigadier-General Jeffreys had disposed of the enemy who had thus suddenly sprung up, or until the Mohmand Field Force, under Major-General Elles, could join him from the south and enable him to attack the Adda Mulla and his gathering, then in position in the Bedmanai Pass, 8 miles south-west from Nawagai.

On the 15th September, Brigadier-General Jeffreys concentrated his force at Inayat Killa, and on the following day began his operations against the hostile Mamund villages. The troops operated in three columns and encountered the enemy at Damadolah, Badam Kili, Shahi Tangi, Badalai and Chingai, in every instance driving them off with loss, but two companies of the 35th, under Captain Ryder, having advanced too far on the ridge above Chingai, were practically surrounded by the enemy and hard pressed during their retirement to camp in the evening; indeed it was with difficulty and not without considerable loss that the detachment was reinforced and brought off by the Guides Infantry under Major Campbell. The necessity of securing the safety of Captain Ryder's detachment delayed the return of the force to camp: the enemy boldly followed the retiring troops, night came on, and in the darkness Brigadier-General Jeffreys with a small force became separated from the rest of the brigade, and was compelled to take post in the little village of Bilot. Here they were hotly assailed by the enemy, who got possession of part of the village, from which, notwithstanding many gallant efforts to dislodge them, they kept up a destructive fire on our troops until midnight, when relief having arrived from camp the tribesmen were driven off. The loss sustained by Brigadier-General

Jeffreys' brigade during the operations of the 16th was considerable, amounting to 39 (including two British officers) killed, and 113 (including six British officers) wounded,—a total of 152. Besides this a large number of horses and mules were killed or wounded, and one section of No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery was completely disabled from this cause. Giving his troops a day of rest Brigadier-General Jeffreys resumed his operations against the Mamunds on the 18th, and in the course of the next few days he attacked and destroyed, with trifling loss, the strongly fortified villages of Damadolah, Hazarnao, Tagai, Dag and Tangai. On the 22nd Sir Bindon Blood joined the brigade from Nawagai.

While these operations against the Mamunds were proceeding the 3rd Brigade had remained stationary, and, until the 19th September, almost undisturbed, at Nawagai. On the night of the 19th, however, an attack was made on the camp by a party of the enemy, who were easily repulsed. On the night of the 20th the attack was repeated, the enemy advancing in force, not less than 3,000 in number; but after several hours' fighting they were repulsed with heavy loss, our own casualties amounting to no more than one killed and 30 wounded, Brigadier-General Wodehouse being amongst the latter. Two days later Sir Bindon Blood sent the 3rd Brigade to join Major-General Elles, with whom communication had now been opened, and himself joined the 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Jeffreys, at Inayat Killa.

For some time the Mamunds had been making offers to submit, and on the 26th September a *jirga* came in to ask for terms; but the negotiations which followed came to nothing, the object of the *jirga* being evidently only to gain time. Accordingly on the 29th September Brigadier-General Jeffreys (who had in the meantime been joined by the 1st Brigade of the Malakand Field Force under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn) resumed his operations, and on the following day he attacked and took the strongly fortified villages of Agrah and Gat, seven miles to the north of Inayat Killa; the enemy held these villages in great force and made an obstinate resistance, but their position was eventually carried by the Royal West Kent Regiment, the 31st Bengal Infantry and the Guides Infantry, the Mamunds suffering severely, while our own loss was considerable, amounting to two British officers and ten men killed, and six British officers and 43 men wounded.

On the 4th October an action took place near Badalai, in which we sustained a loss of two killed and 16 wounded, the enemy again suffering severely. This was the last action fought, for during the following week the Mamund *jirga* came in and made complete submission, and the force, having further punished the Salarzais and the Shamozaï section of the Utman Khels for their share in the outbreak of the previous July, returned to the Swat Valley towards the end of October.

During these operations the casualties in the Malakand Field Force amounted to 62 (including six British officers) killed and 246 (including nineteen British officers) wounded,—a total of 308.

Operations of the Mohmand Field Force.—The force under the command of Major-General Elles was concentrated at Shabkadar on the 13th September, and on the 15th the advance into the Mohmand country was begun. Contrary to expectation the force met with no opposition in proceeding up the Gandab Valley, the only difficulties experienced being those arising from the excessively rugged nature of the country, the absence of practicable paths, and the scarcity of water. Overcoming these formidable obstacles, Major-General Elles,

with his 1st Brigade, two mountain batteries, and three squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers, reached Lakarai in the Nawagai Valley, about six miles from Brigadier-General Wodehouse's camp, on the 21st September, where he was met by Sir Bindon Blood ; and the 3rd Brigade of the Malakand Field Force (now under the command of Colonel Graves, 39th Bengal Infantry) having been placed at his disposal, he moved to Kaz Chinari on the 22nd, preparatory to dealing with the Adda Mulla and his gathering, then occupying the Bedmanai Pass in formidable numbers. On the following day the Bedmanai Pass was forced with a trifling loss of one man killed and five wounded, the hostile gathering having in a great measure been taken by surprise. On the 24th and 25th the Mitai and Suran valleys were visited, and on the latter date a portion of the force penetrated, after a smart action (in which we lost one man killed and fifteen wounded) into the Jarobi Glen, the home of the Adda Mulla. On the 27th, the fortified villages of the Kuda Khel were destroyed after some opposition, in which five men were wounded. Subsequently the Yakhdand, Pipal and Danish Kol districts were visited, and then, as the Adda Mulla had fled into Afghan territory, the force, including the 3rd Brigade of the Malakand Field Force, was withdrawn to Peshawar. The losses sustained by Major-General Elles' force during these operations amounted to no more than five killed and 30 wounded.

XVIII.

Operations against
the Utman Khels.

In November 1897 a portion of the Malakand Field Force was detached for the purpose of exacting reparation from the cis-Swat Utman Khels for their complicity in the attack on the Malakand in the previous July. The force detailed for this purpose—consisting of No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, No. 5 Company of the Madras Sappers and Miners, a squadron of the 10th Bengal Lancers, the 1st Battalion of the East Kent Regiment and the 21st (Punjab) and 35th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry—was placed under the command of Colonel A. J. F. Reid, and moved into the Utman Khel country on the 24th November, and in the course of the next fortnight visited Agrah, Upper Totai and Khanauri without meeting any opposition. The Utman Khels complied with the terms imposed upon them, and the force returned to Malakand early in December.

At the same time the 16th Bengal Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Montanaro, was detached into the Laman Utman Khel country, to punish that section for complicity in the raid on Shabkadar in August. No opposition was experienced: the people were submissive and readily complied with our terms, surrendering the arms demanded of them and paying a fine of Rs. 2,000.

1897-98.

XIX.

The Tirah
Expedition.

The question of dealing with the Afridis and Orakzais and of the best means of exacting submission and reparation for the unprovoked aggressions of these tribes on the Peshawar and Kohat borders was the subject of the earnest consideration of the Government of India during the month of September 1897. It was decided that these objects would best be accomplished by the invasion in force of Tirah, the summer home of both tribes, which up to this time had never been entered by a British force.

Accordingly a strong force, styled the "Tirah Expeditionary Force," under the command of General Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., with Brigadier-General W. G. Nicholson, C.B., as Chief of the Staff, was formed to carry out the objects of the Government of India, and was organised as follows :—

- I. A main column of two divisions, each composed of two brigades and certain divisional troops, to advance on Tirah from Miranzai.
 - II. A force of one regiment of native cavalry and four battalions of native infantry to hold the Line of Communications of the main column from Kohat to Tirah, inclusive of the posts on the Samana Range.
 - III. A mixed brigade (which was styled the "Peshawar Column"), to operate as might be required from Peshawar.
 - IV. A force (which was designated the "Kuram Moveable Column") to act as a support on the Hangu-Parachinar line, and to operate according to circumstances.
 - V. A mixed brigade at Rawal Pindi as a Reserve.
- These several forces were composed as follows :—

THE MAIN COLUMN.

FIRST DIVISION.

Major-General W. P. Symons, C.B., Commanding.

1st Brigade.

1st Battalion, Devonshire Regiment.	} Brigadier-General I. S. M. Hamilton, C. B., D.S.O., Commanding.*
2nd Battalion, Derbyshire Regiment.	
2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles.	
30th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.	

2nd Brigade.

1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment.	} Brigadier-General A. Gaselee, C.B., Commanding.
2nd Battalion, Yorkshire Regiment.	
2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles.	
3rd Sikh Infantry.	

Divisional Troops.

No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.
 No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.
 Nos. 3 and 4 Companies, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
 The Maler Kotla Sappers, Imperial Service Troops.
 The 18th Bengal Lancers (two squadrons).
 The 28th Bombay Infantry (Pioneers).
 The Nabha Regiment of Infantry, Imperial Service Troops.

SECOND DIVISION.

Major-General A. G. Yeatman-Biggs, C.B., Commanding.

3rd Brigade.

1st Battalion, Dorsetshire Regiment.	} Brigadier-General F. J. Kempster, D.S.O., Commanding.
1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders.	
1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkha Rifles.	
15th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry.	

* While the concentration of the force was proceeding, Brigadier-General Hamilton was disabled by a fall from his horse, and was replaced by Brigadier-General R. C. Hart, C.B., V.C.

4th Brigade.

2nd Battalion, The King's Own Scottish Borderers.	} Brigadier-General R. Westmacott, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding.
1st Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment.	
1st Battalion, 3rd Gurkha Rifles.	
36th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry.	

Divisional Troops.

No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.
 Maxim gun detachment, 16th (The Queen's) Lancers.
 No. 4 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
 The Sirmur Sappers, Imperial Service Troops.
 The 18th Bengal Lancers (two squadrons).
 1st Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers (one wing—added afterwards in November).
 The 21st Madras Infantry (Pioneers).
 The Jhind Regiment of Infantry, Imperial Service Troops.

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS.

Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Palmer, K.C.B., Commanding.

The 3rd Bengal Cavalry.
 The 22nd (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.
 The 39th (Garhwal) Bengal Infantry (Rifles).
 The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Gurkha Rifles.
 The 2nd Punjab Infantry.
 The Jeypore Imperial Service Transport Corps.
 The Gwalior Imperial Service Transport Corps.

PESHAWAR COLUMN.

Brigadier-General A. G. Hammond, C.B., D.S.O., V.C., Commanding.

The 57th Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
 9th Bengal Lancers.
 2nd Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
 2nd Battalion, Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
 9th (Gurkha) Bengal Infantry.
 34th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry (Pioneers).
 45th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry.

KURAM MOVEABLE COLUMN.

Colonel W. Hill, Commanding.

3rd Field Battery, Royal Artillery (four guns).
 6th Bengal Cavalry.
 1st Central India Horse (two squadrons).
 2nd Central India Horse (two squadrons).
 12th Bengal Infantry.
 The Kapurthalla Regiment of Infantry, Imperial Service Troops.

RESERVE BRIGADE.

Brigadier-General C. R. Macgregor, D.S.O., Commanding.

The Jodhpur Lancers, Imperial Service Troops.
 2nd Battalion, The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.
 1st Battalion, The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
 27th (Baluch) Bombay Infantry.
 2nd Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.

The approximate strength of these several forces was—

Main Column	18,600
Line of Communication	4,900
Peshawar Column	4,500
Kuram Moveable Column	2,500
Reserve Brigade	3,700
TOTAL	<u>34,200</u>

of which about one-third were British, and two-thirds native, troops.

Operations of the Main Column to the end of November 1897.—The Second Division (less a mountain battery and two battalions, which were in occupation of the Samana Ridge) was concentrated at Shinaori by the 16th October, and the First Division being expected to be assembled there by the 19th, orders were issued for an advance to be made on Karappa, in the Khanki Valley, on the 20th. It was necessary, however, to first clear the Dargai heights, west of the Chagru Kotal, which were held by bands of Orakzai and Afridi sharp-shooters, whose fire annoyed the troops and labourers employed in improving the road from the Chagru Kotal to Karappa, and had already occasioned several casualties. Accordingly on the 18th two small columns were detailed for this purpose under the command of Brigadier-Generals Westmacott and Kempster, the whole under the direction of Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Palmer,—the one to make a front attack on Dargai, and the other to make a flank movement and clear the heights to the west of that place. Both operations were successfully carried out and heavy loss inflicted on the tribesmen, but the sound of the firing had brought up large reinforcements to the enemy, from the Khanki Valley, and when towards evening our troops began to retire the tribesmen followed them boldly, and a hot engagement ensued between them and our rear-guard. Eventually the enemy were repulsed with loss, and the troops returned to Shinaori, having lost during the day's fighting one officer and 8 men killed and one officer and 31 men wounded.

On the 19th Dargai and the adjacent heights were re-occupied by the enemy in great force, and it once more became necessary to dislodge them when the advance towards Karappa was begun on the following morning. The troops to whose lot it fell to accomplish this service were the 3rd Brigade, the 4th Brigade (less the Northamptonshire Regiment and the 36th Bengal Infantry, who were otherwise employed) and the Derbyshire Regiment and the 3rd Sikh Infantry from the First Division.

Under cover of a concentrated artillery fire from twenty-four guns the 3rd Brigade advanced to the attack of the heights at 11-30 A. M. In doing this they were compelled to cross an open space which was swept from end to end by the musketry of the enemy on the heights, and when the 2nd Gurkhas made the first rush across this space they were met with such a hot and well-aimed fire that they could do no more than hold on to the cover they had reached without being able to advance further. An hour later the Dorsetshire and Derbyshire Regiments were directed to attack, but only a few men succeeded in getting across "the fire-swept zone," and it was then reported that owing to the large number of the enemy lining the edge of the Dargai plateau and the steepness of the ascent, any advance beyond the line held by the 2nd Gurkhas was impracticable. The Gordon Highlanders, supported by the 3rd Sikh Infantry, were then moved up to the front, and after a brief halt, during

which a heavy artillery fire was concentrated on the enemy's position, were directed to attack. Dashing across the open, the Gordons, supported by the 2nd Gurkhas and the 3rd Sikhs, went straight up the hill without check or hesitation through a murderous fire, carried the long-contested heights, and drove the enemy headlong into the Khanki Valley. Our entire losses in the day's fighting amounted to three British officers, one native officer and thirty-four men killed and nine British officers, five native officers and 147 men wounded,—a total of 199 casualties.

The advance into the Khanki Valley was resumed on the 21st October, and on the 25th the two divisions (except two battalions left behind to hold Dargai and the Chagru Kotal, and a battalion of Pioneers and two companies of sappers employed in improving the road in the rear) were concentrated at Karappa and its vicinity. The enemy offered no resistance to this forward movement, contenting themselves with harassing convoys and reconnoitring parties and firing into camp at night, a practice which they maintained throughout the campaign, thereby occasioning many casualties. On the 28th the Sampagha Pass, which was held by large bodies of the enemy, was reconnoitred in force, with a loss on our side of two killed and eleven wounded; on the following day the troops advanced and carried the pass with little loss (one officer and one man killed, and one officer and twenty-nine men wounded), and on the 31st the Arhanga Pass was forced with a loss of only one man killed and one officer and two men wounded. The main body had now reached its objective, and (less one brigade which had been left in Mastura to dominate that valley and hold the Sampagha Pass) took up a position in the Maidan of Tirah.

The following week was employed in reconnoitring the country in various directions, and Bagh and the Tseri Kandao (leading into the Waran Valley, lying east of Maidan) were visited in force; and on the 4th November a proclamation was issued to the various Afridi and Orakzai clans, directing them to send in representatives to hear the conditions under which their submission would be accepted by the Government of India.

On the 9th a reconnaissance in force was made to the crest of the Saran Sar, a peak situated about five miles to the east of camp. During the advance but few of the enemy were seen, but when the retirement was begun in the afternoon the tribesmen appeared in great numbers and pressed the rear-guard closely: severe fighting ensued and a party of the Northamptonshire Regiment, becoming entangled in a ravine, was cut off and totally destroyed. Eventually as night came on the enemy retired and the reconnoitring force reached camp, having sustained heavy loss,—20 (including two British officers) killed, and 43 (including three British officers) wounded,—63 in all. Two days later the Saran Sar was again visited and the survey of the eastern section of the Maidan Valley completed, with scarcely any opposition from the enemy.

On the 12th November a representative *jirga* of the Orakzai clans came in, and the terms of the Government of India were made known to them. These were the surrender of all Government property carried off by them; the surrender of 500 breech-loading rifles; payment of a fine of Rs. 30,000; a complete survey of their country; and formal and complete submission to the Government of India, with surrender of hostages for fulfilment of the terms. A fortnight was given to them for compliance. Three of the Afridi clans also sent in representatives, but the greater part of this tribe still held out, vainly hoping for aid from Kabul.

On the 13th a force was sent over the Tseri Kandao into the Waran Valley to destroy the defences of the Zakka Khel villages there, on which service it was engaged during the 14th and 15th without meeting much opposition or sustaining much loss. On the 16th, however, when the force was retiring to Maidan, the Zakka Khel and Aka Khel Afridis assembled in great numbers and attacked it while retiring over the Tseri Kandao. Part of the force having been belated, had to take post in a village, on which the enemy delivered a series of desperate attacks throughout the night, but every assault was repelled and the detachment got into camp on the morning of the 17th. The losses sustained on this expedition amounted to four British officers and 27 men killed, and three British officers, three native officers, and 45 men wounded,—a total of 82.

During the next few days the camp was moved to Bagh, and on the 21st the terms of the Government of India were made known to such of the Afridi representatives as had come in. These were the same as those notified to the Orakzais, except that the fine in rifles was fixed at 800 and in cash at Rs. 50,000; and the following were added, *viz.*, the restoration of all the Snider rifles carried off from or by the Khaibar Rifles; the restoration of the Government property and the property of the Commandant of the Khaibar Rifles looted at Landi Kotal, or payment of the value of such property; and the re-opening of the Khaibar Pass on such terms as the Government of India might consider desirable. One week was given for compliance with these terms, failing which compliance the representatives were warned that systematic punishment would begin.

On the 22nd Sir William Lockhart marched with a small force to Dwatoi (the confluence of the Shilobar and Bara rivers), and on the 23rd destroyed the defences of the Kuki Khel villages in the Lower Rajgal Valley, returning to Bagh on the 24th. Both in going and returning considerable opposition was met with, and in the fighting which took place one officer and three men were killed and two officers and 31 men wounded.

The period of grace granted to the Mamuzai and Massuzai sections of the Orakzais and to the Khani Khel Chamkannis having expired on the 26th November without their having complied with the terms imposed upon them for their raids into the Kuram Valley, Sir William Lockhart moved from Bagh on that date, with a force under Brigadier-General Gaselee, for the purpose of coercing these clans in co-operation with the Kuram Moveable Column, which was now directed to move up through the Kharmana defile and meet the force from Bagh at Hissar, in the Massuzai country, on the 29th. On the 27th the Kahu Pass, leading into the Massuzai country, was seized, and in a series of skirmishes that occurred there and in the neighbourhood from the 26th to the 29th a loss was sustained of five killed and 32 (including two British officers) wounded; and on the 29th the Massuzai *jirga* came into camp and expressed their readiness to submit. On the same day communication was opened with the Kuram Column under Colonel Hill, and on the 30th Sir William Lockhart, with a mountain battery and three battalions, joined that officer at Hissar. To the proceedings of the Kuram Column up to this date attention may now be directed.

Operations of the Kuram Moveable Column.—The troops detailed for the Kuram Moveable Column were all in the Kuram Valley by the middle of October, but excepting a skirmish with a band of Massuzais who came down

the Kharmana Darra on the 17th October, and with some Chamkannis who raided down to Ibrahimzai on the 22nd, nothing worthy of notice occurred until the 7th November, on which date Colonel Hill made a reconnaissance in force through the Kharmana defile to Hissar, in order to explore the ground through which the column would have to move in the event of operations being undertaken against the Chamkannis. No opposition was met with in the advance, but when the column began to retrace its steps to Sadda the enemy (both Massuzais and Chamkannis) assembled in considerable numbers and assailed the rear-guard. They were immediately driven back and many killed, and the column got through the defile with trifling loss except as regards a flanking party of a native officer and 35 men of the Kapurthalla Infantry who in the general retirement strayed from the right direction, became entangled in difficult ground, and were totally cut off and massacred by the enemy, not a single man escaping to tell the tale.

Subsequent to this nothing of importance occurred in the Kuram Valley until the 28th November, when, in compliance with the instructions of Sir William Lockhart, Colonel Hill left Sadda for Hissar with the following force :—

A Maxim gun detachment (Royal Scots Fusiliers).
6th Bengal Cavalry (50 mounted and 150 dismounted men).
Central India Horse (50 mounted and 150 dismounted men).
12th Bengal Infantry (400 men).
1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles (200 men).
Kapurthalla Infantry (200 men).

With this force he reached Hissar on the 29th, having met with no opposition in the Kharmana defile, and here on the following day he was joined by Sir William Lockhart, with a portion of Brigadier-General Gaselee's brigade.

On the 1st December, under the orders of Sir William Lockhart, Colonel Hill, with the Kuram Column, to which, for the day's operations, No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery and the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Gurkha Rifles were added, marched from Hissar to take punitive action against the Khani Khel Chamkannis. The enemy held the village of Thabai and the surrounding heights and made a stubborn resistance, but they were eventually driven off with heavy loss and a part of their villages destroyed. Before the work could be completed, however, it became necessary to return to camp in order to avoid being belated. The force moved out again on the following day, and succeeded, notwithstanding the resistance of the enemy, in destroying the remainder of the Thabai villages. In these two days' operations our losses amounted to 9 (including one British officer) killed, and 21 (including three British officers) wounded.

On the 3rd December Colonel Hill returned to Sadda with the Kuram Column, taking with him the sick and wounded of the force which had accompanied Sir William Lockhart from Bagh.

Nothing of importance occurred in the Kuram Valley during the remainder of the war.

Operations of the Main Column to the 20th December.—On the conclusion of the operations against the Chamkannis and Massuzai Orakzais Sir William Lockhart, with the force under Brigadier-General Gaselee, marched to Khanki Bazar, and, having received the submission of the Mamuzai Orakzais, he returned, over the Chingakh Pass, to Bagh on the 6th December. During his absence nothing of importance had occurred in Afridi Tirah, but,

under instructions left by him, when proceeding against the Orakzais and Chamkannis, preparations had been in progress for a change of base from Shinaori to Peshawar, and for the execution of the plan of operations which was now to be adopted in consequence of the unadvisability of retaining the British forces in the highlands of Tirah during the winter. The plan in contemplation was to evacuate Tirah before the extreme rigors of winter set in, to roll back the existing line of communications to Shinaori, and to withdraw the force (the 1st Division by way of the Mastura Valley and the 2nd Division through Dwatoi and the Bara Valley) to the vicinity of Peshawar, and thence to operate against the Afridis of the Lower Bara and Bazar Valleys and re-occupy the Khaibar. As a part of this plan of operations, the Peshawar Column, which, under the command of Brigadier-General Hammond, had hitherto been retained in the vicinity of Peshawar, was ordered to advance to Barkai in the Bara Valley on the 8th December, and there meet the Main Column on its downward march.

All needful preparations having been completed and the various Afridi clans notified that if they still refused to submit and conform to the terms of the Government of India the troops would return to Tirah in the spring, Sir William Lockhart, with the 3rd Brigade, marched from Bagh to Dwatoi on the 7th December, and was joined there on the following day by the 4th Brigade. On the 9th the settlements of the Kuki Khel Afridis in the Rajgal Valley were visited, the village defences destroyed, and the survey of the valley completed, and on the following day both brigades marched down the Bara Valley, through the country of the Kambar Khel and Sipah Khel Afridis, to Sandana, meeting with little opposition from the tribesmen. On the 11th the two brigades marched through the territory of the Zakka Khel Afridis to Sherkhel, a distance of ten miles down the Bara Valley. During the day the troops were slightly harassed by the Afridi sharp-shooters, but as evening came on the tribesmen gathered in formidable numbers and hotly attacked the rear-guard, a portion of which, under the command of Major Downman of the Gordon Highlanders, being encumbered with many killed and wounded, was compelled to take post in some villages two miles and a half short of Sherkhel. Here they were frequently assailed during the night, but repelled every attack and maintained their ground until extricated by a reinforcement on the following morning. On the 12th the troops were halted to enable them to rest and to dry their clothes, which thirty-six hours' of continuous rain had thoroughly saturated. On the following day the march was resumed, and the troops, leaving the Bara River at Galikhel, moved in a north-easterly direction and encamped near the Narkandai Kotal, where they came into communication with Brigadier-General Hammond and the Peshawar Column. Throughout the day the 4th Brigade, which was in the rear, was continually attacked and at times closely pressed, suffering considerable loss; but much heavier loss was inflicted on the enemy, who, nevertheless, continued their attacks throughout the night. On the 14th both brigades marched to Mamanai, within a mile of the camp of the Peshawar Column at Swaikot; the enemy followed as on the previous day, but received severe punishment, and eventually retired. The Division halted on the 15th and 16th, and on the 17th the 3rd Brigade marched to Fort Bara, leaving the 4th Brigade and the divisional troops in camp at Mamanai. During these operations, from Bagh in Tirah to Mamanai in the Bara Valley, the losses sustained by the Second Division, under the command of Sir William Lockhart, amounted

to 33 (including one British officer) killed, and 135 (including 5 British officers) wounded,—making a total of 168 casualties.

In the meantime the First Division, under the command of Major-General Symons, had moved on the separate line assigned to it. On the 8th December the 1st Brigade marched from Mastura to Haidar Khel, and the 2nd Brigade reached Mastura from Bagh. On the 9th the 1st Brigade marched to Hissar at the junction of the Mastura and Waran rivers, destroying the defences of the Aka Khel villages *en route*, and the 2nd Brigade marched to Haidar Khel. On the 10th the two brigades marched to Barand Khel and Tarkasam, respectively; on the 12th and 13th the Sapri Pass was crossed, and passing through Mamanai, in the Bara Valley, on the 14th and 15th, the Division concentrated near Fort Bara on the 17th. The march of the Division had been practically unopposed, and it came through with no greater loss than one man killed and eight wounded. On the 19th the Division marched to Jamrud, in view to the operations now to be undertaken against the Afridis of Bazar and for the re-occupation of the Khaibar.

Affairs on the Peshawar Border, October to December, 1897.—While the expedition into Tirah was proceeding, very little of importance occurred on the Peshawar border. The Peshawar Column was formed early in October, and part of it was placed near Fort Bara, but, except as regards a few skirmishes with marauding bands of Afridis near the frontier, it was not engaged. On the 10th October a reconnoitring party was fired on at the Samghakha Pass and an officer killed. On the 18th there was a rather unfortunate affair near Mamanai. A reconnaissance along the road from Bara to Mamanai having been ordered, two squadrons of the 9th Bengal Lancers were detailed for the purpose; by an error of judgment the officer commanding got entangled in the hills, where they were ambuscaded, when retiring, by a band of 500 Afridis and Orakzais, and lost a native officer and three men killed and four men wounded, while several men fell into the hands of the enemy. The enemy retired immediately after the action, and a force that was sent towards Mamanai on the 19th returned without having seen them.

On the 21st October the column was concentrated near Fort Bara, and remained there until the 19th November, when it moved forward to Ilam Gudr, three miles from Bara. During this interval the camp was frequently harassed and fired into by marauding parties of the enemy, principally Zakka Khel and Aka Khel Afridis. At Ilam Gudr the enemy continued their practice of firing into camp and on the working parties engaged in improving the road up the Bara Valley, and a few casualties occurred. On the 7th December the Peshawar column marched from Ilam Gudr to Swaikot, a mile and a half beyond Mamanai, sustaining in the movement a loss of one man of the Inniskilling Fusiliers killed and one wounded. On the 10th a detachment moved onwards to Barkai, and on the 13th the Column came into communication with the force moving down the Bara Valley under Sir William Lockhart.

On the 15th and 16th December, in accordance with the plan of the operations now to be undertaken for the punishment of the Afridis of the Bazar Valley and for the re-occupation of the Khaibar, the Peshawar Column left Swaikot for Jamrud, at the mouth of the Khaibar Pass, at which place it arrived on the 17th. Shortly after the Column was designated the 5th Brigade of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, and attached to the 1st Division.

Operations of the Main Column from the 20th of December 1897 to the end of the War.—Leaving the 3rd Brigade (in which the Dorsetshire Regiment—much weakened by sickness and losses in action—was now relieved by the 1st Battalion of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry) at Bara and the 4th Brigade (in which the Northamptonshire Regiment had been similarly relieved by the 2nd Battalion of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry) at Mamanai, the whole under Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Palmer, K.C.B., who had been appointed to the command of the Second Division in place of Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, who had been invalided and died shortly afterwards from the effects of the campaign, Sir William Lockhart proceeded to Jamrud on the 18th December, to set on foot the operations now to be undertaken in the Khaibar and in the Bazar Valley. The troops detailed for this service consisted of the 1st Brigade (in which the Devonshire Regiment had, for the same reasons as in the cases already mentioned, been relieved by the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Sussex Regiment) and the 2nd and 5th Brigades. The operations were begun on the 23rd December by the advance of the 5th Brigade into the Khaibar, and the unopposed re-occupation of Fort Maude and Ali Masjid. Leaving garrisons in these places, the Column moved on to Landi Kotal, and occupied that place also on the 26th. In the meantime, on the 24th, the 1st Division had marched from Jamrud to Lala China, three miles short of Ali Masjid, and on the 25th it advanced into the Bazar Valley in two columns, of which the left column reached Chora and the right column Karamna the same day. On the 26th the two columns marched to and occupied China and Barg, respectively. On the 27th, after destroying the towers and defences of China, Sir William Lockhart marched back to Chora, and the same day the right column, under Major-General Symons, reached the Palosi caves. On the 28th Sir William Lockhart, with the left column, marched back to Lala China. On the same day the right column fell back to Karamna, and on the following day, after destroying the defences of Karamna, it marched back to Lala China, and on the 30th the First Division was once more concentrated at Jamrud.

During these operations the Afridis had offered considerable resistance, particularly at Barg and Karamna, and, while suffering heavily themselves, had inflicted on the force a loss of one British officer and ten men killed, and one British officer and 47 men wounded,—a total of 59.

On the 30th December, General Sir H. M. Havelock-Allan, G.C.B., who had been on a visit to Landi Kotal, having unfortunately left his escort, was waylaid on his return between Ali Masjid and Jamrud, and shot dead by a lurking party of Afridis.

During the progress of the Bazar Valley Expedition, and for some time afterwards, there had been a good deal of skirmishing with detached bodies of the enemy, principally Zakka Khels, throughout the whole length of the Khaibar Pass. In one of these skirmishes, on the 30th December, near Landi Kotal, the Oxfordshire Light Infantry sustained a loss of three men killed and three officers and 11 men wounded, and in another near Sultankhel, on the 3rd January, Major Hickman, commanding the 34th Bengal Infantry, was unfortunately shot dead. Altogether up to the middle of January these skirmishes cost us a loss of one officer and 10 men killed and five officers and 24 men wounded, and in view of the continued hostility shown by the Zakka Khels it became necessary to reinforce the troops in the pass by the 1st Brigade, which was moved up to Ali Masjid, and the troops there of the 5th Brigade sent on to Landi Kotal.

Some skirmishing also occurred on the Bara line, and on the 16th and 18th January working parties of the Bombay pioneer regiment were fired on at Gandao, and lost several men killed and wounded.

On the 17th January a *jirga*, representing four of the Afridi clans, arrived at Jamrud, and expressed their readiness to submit, but as no tangible proofs of their sincerity were forthcoming, while raiding parties from other clans still continued to attack our posts and convoys, the *jirga* were informed that until the whole tribe exhibited a more submissive attitude and evinced their readiness to pay the fines and surrender the rifles demanded of them, the state of war between them and the Government of India could not be modified.

Intelligence having been received that a large number of Afridi cattle had been seen grazing on the Kajurai plain, which lies to the north of the Bara river, four columns, detailed from the 1st and 2nd Divisions, were set in motion on the 29th January, three—from Ali Musjid, Jamrud and Mamanai—to close the exits from the Kajurai plain, and the fourth—from Bara—to operate in the valley and seize the cattle. The Mamanai column, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Seppings, which was composed of—

No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery (two guns),
The 2nd Battalion, The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry,
The 36th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry (four companies),

was the only one which came in contact with the enemy. Leaving Mamanai at 5 A.M., it reached Shinkamar Kotal at 10-30 A.M., without having seen an enemy. In the afternoon, however, when the column began to retire, the enemy as usual pressed the troops closely, and it was not until Brigadier-General Westmacott brought up a reinforcement that the column could be extricated and continue its retirement to Mamanai. The loss sustained by the column was serious, 5 officers and 28 men having been killed and 3 officers and 34 men wounded,—70 in all. Among the killed was Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton, commanding the 36th Bengal Infantry, an officer who had brilliantly distinguished himself on several occasions during the war. Very few of the cattle, the presence of which in the Kajurai plain had led to this expedition, were seen or captured by the other columns.

On the 31st a force of 2,000 men, taken from the 3rd and 4th Brigades, was despatched, under the command of Brigadier-General Westmacott, to the Shinkamar Pass, for the purpose of recovering the bodies of such of the slain as the troops engaged on the 29th had been unable to remove. This was accomplished without resistance, but during the retirement the enemy again followed the troops, and in the skirmishing which ensued two officers and five men were wounded. On the same day a large number of Afridi camels were captured on the Kajurai plain by a squadron of the 9th Bengal Lancers.

On the 8th February the Afridi *jirga* was informed that unless the terms imposed by Government were complied with by the 23rd, active hostilities would be resumed, and the invasion of Tirah repeated, and on the 12th, by way of a demonstration, the 3rd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Hamilton (who had recently relieved Brigadier-General Kempster) was moved forward to Barkai.

The Afridis had now begun to perceive the uselessness of further resistance, and rather than endure a repetition of the invasion of Tirah, they at last yielded to the terms imposed upon them, and by the 4th of April they had so far complied

with those terms that there remained only a balance of 11 rifles to be surrendered and Rs. 900 of the fine to be paid in. In the course of the next few weeks the forces which had been put in the field were gradually demobilised, and the Frontier War of 1897-98 was at an end.

During these operations the Afridi and Orakzai tribes had suffered heavy losses; their country had been traversed from end to end; the towers and walls of every fortified village had been levelled with the ground; and their winter supplies of food, fodder and fuel had been consumed. Above all, they had learnt the bitter lesson that however rugged and intricate their country might be, it was not, as they had fondly believed, inaccessible to a British force. These results had not, however, been attained without heavy loss on our side, for during the protracted operations from October 1897 to March 1898, the Tirah Expeditionary Force had sustained casualties to the extent of—

Killed	{	23 officers, 4 native officers, 260 men.
Wounded	{	56 officers, 15 native officers, 782 men,

making, with ten men reported "missing," a total of 1,150 casualties.

On the demobilisation of the forces, a mixed brigade (one British mountain battery, half a troop of native cavalry, a company of sappers, two battalions of British infantry and two battalions of native infantry) was retained at Landi Kotal, as a temporary measure, under the command of Brigadier-General Egerton, for the purpose of holding the pass.

1898.

XX.

In November 1897 the question of punishing the Bunerwals and the Chamlawals for their complicity in the attack on the Malakand came under consideration. This matter had been deferred on account of the more urgent necessity of disposing of the Adda Mulla and his gathering. Before moving a force into Buner and Chamla to exact reparation, the Government of India decided on announcing certain terms, and it was notified to the Bunerwals that they were required to restore all Government property carried off by them, and pay a fine of 600 guns and Rs. 11,500 in cash; at the same time the Chamlawals were required to surrender 100 guns and 100 swords and pay a fine of Rs. 1,500: failing compliance with these terms (which were announced to them in December) it was proclaimed that they would be exacted by force. The tribesmen failed to comply with the terms imposed upon them, and accordingly early in January 1898 the following force (taken from the Malakand Field Force) was organised, under the command of Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., for operations in Buner and Chamla :—

Expedition against
the Bunerwals and
Chamlawals.

1st Brigade.

1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment.	{	Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., Commanding.
16th Bengal Infantry.		
20th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.		
31st (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.		

2nd Brigade.

1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment.	} Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C.B., Commanding.
21st (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.	
Infantry of the Corps of Guides.	

Divisional Troops.

10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
 No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
 No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
 10th Bengal Lancers (three squadrons).
 Cavalry of the Corps of Guides (two squadrons).
 2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry.
 3rd Bombay Infantry.

On the 6th January (the last day of grace given to the Bunerwals to comply with the terms imposed upon them) Sir Bindon Blood and the greater part of the force were at Sanghao, twenty-one miles to the north of Mardan; on the same date two battalions and some sappers under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel McRae were at Pirsai, and the whole of the cavalry at Rustum under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams. On the following morning Sir Bindon Blood advanced to take the Tanga Pass, a strong position which was held in great force by the Bunerwals, and it was anticipated that the position would not be forced without considerable loss; but crushed by the heavy and accurate firing of our artillery, and demoralised by the long-range volleys of the East Kent Regiment, which caused them great loss, the enemy made but a feeble resistance to the advance of the infantry, and early in the afternoon the pass was carried with no greater loss on our side than one soldier of the Highland Light Infantry mortally wounded.

The same day the detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel McRae (the Guides Infantry and the 31st Bengal Infantry) forced the Pirsai Pass with little opposition and no loss. The detachment, together with the cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, then crossed over the pass, and eventually joined the 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn.

The affair of the Tanga Pass completely demoralised the enemy, who offered no further resistance, and after various parts of the country (both Buner and Chamla) had been visited, the tribesmen made complete submission and complied in full with the terms which had been imposed upon them by the Government of India, and on the 19th January, twelve days after the commencement of the expedition, the whole of the troops were marched over the Ambeyla Pass and returned to British territory.

These were the last operations in which the troops of the Malakand Field Force were engaged. In the course of February 1898 the force was demobilised, only the following reduced force (which was designated the "Malakand Force") being retained on or in the neighbourhood of the Malakand Pass, to maintain communication with Chitral *viâ* the Dir-Chitral road:—

- 1 native mountain battery;
- 2 companies of sappers and miners;
- 3 squadrons of native cavalry;
- 1 battalion of British infantry; and
- 5 battalions of native infantry.

In July 1898 this force was still further reduced to—

- 1 native mountain battery;
- 1 company of sappers and miners;
- 2 squadrons of native cavalry; and
- 4 battalions of native infantry.

XXI.

The losses sustained by the British forces during the Frontier War of 1897-98 are estimated at 470 (including 34 British officers) killed in action; 1,524 (including 104 British officers) wounded,—of whom many afterwards died of the injuries they had received; and 10 missing,—making a total of 2,004 casualties.

XXII.

In January 1898 an outbreak, connected with disturbances beyond the frontier in Persian territory, took place in the Kej Valley in Mekran, and Baluch Khan, Chief of Kolwa, made a sudden and treacherous attack on a survey party, under Captain Burn, at Hor Kalat, killed some of the party, and sacked their camp. An attack on Ormara was also threatened, and a detachment of 250 men of the 30th Bombay Infantry was promptly despatched by sea from Karachi, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Mayne, for the purpose of protecting that place and putting down the disturbances. The detachment landed at Ormara on the 13th January, and subsequently moved to Pasni, where it was reinforced by 120 more men of the 30th Bombay Infantry and two guns of No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery, and later on by 60 sabres of the 6th Bombay Cavalry and a party of Bombay sappers.

On the 27th January, Colonel Mayne started for Kalatuk, where the Nazim of Kej was hard pressed by the insurgents. On the 31st he encountered the enemy at Gok Parosh and completely routed them with a loss of about 500 killed and wounded, Baluch Khan, the leading spirit in the outbreak, and many other prominent chiefs being amongst the former, while our own casualties amounted to no more than 3 killed and 12 wounded; and on the same day Turbat was occupied. During the next few days various parts of the country were visited, but no further resistance was attempted. The troops returned to Karachi in March.

XXIII.

1898.—In March 1898 some disturbances occurred on the Burmo-Chinese frontier, the Saubwa of the Mong-Wan State (encouraged, it is believed, by the Chinese Delimitation Commissioner) having, while the delimitation of the Chinese and British frontiers was proceeding, sent an armed force of Shan Chinese into British territory, in the Bhamo District, and erected stockades at Sadon, Sengmye and Maipat.

This aggression was not to be tolerated, and accordingly a detachment of the Bhamo Military Police Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Langtry, was sent up from Bhamo to expel the intruders. On the 20th March the stockade at Sadon was captured and destroyed, after a brief conflict, four of the enemy being killed and about twenty taken prisoners, with a loss on our

side of Lieutenant Langtry and four men slightly wounded. The detachment next moved on Sengmye and Maipat, but both were found to have been evacuated, and having destroyed the stockades, Lieutenant Langtry returned to Sadon.

Net extra expenditure on account of expeditions and military operations from 1894 to 1898.

The following table contains a list of the principal expeditions, etc., which have been undertaken during the past five years, and the net extra expenditure incurred in India in connection with each :—

Expeditions, etc.	Year of occurrence.	Net extra expenditure in India (in round figures).	REMARKS.
		Rx.	
Chin Hills	1893-94	3,500	Borne by Home Government.
Abor	1893-94	1,500	
Waziristan	1894	251,000	
Chitral Relief Force	1895	1,684,000	
Egypt (Suakin)	1896	231,000	
Tochi Field Force	1897	—	Accounts not yet closed.
Malakand			
Mohmand			
Utman Khel			
Kohat-Kuram	1897-98	...	
Tirah			
Buner			
Mekran			

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